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Abstract 
 
Recent research investigating how differences between individual athletes influences the 
distribution of energy resources during an athletic task has highlighted the importance of risk 
in sports. Athletes with lower perceptions of risk display relatively faster initial pacing 
strategies than higher risk perceivers, yet it is not understood how risk has this effect within 
individual athletes. This thesis is directed at gaining further insight into how risk relates to 
pacing behaviour and is comprised of one literature review and one experimental study. The 
concept of risk is first introduced and associated with athletic pacing in the literature review 
where methods are also proposed which may help provide greater insight into risk related 
pacing behaviours (BART and DOSPERT as measures of risk behaviour and attitude, and tDCS as 
a risk modulation technique). The experimental chapter introduces the BART risk behaviour 
measure along with an already established measure of risk attitude in pacing research (the 
DOSPERT) to a time trial pacing context and demonstrates how different facets of risk have 
similar influences on pacing behaviour. tDCS is further used to modulate athlete risk taking 
behaviour to understand how a change in risk characteristics reflect in pacing behaviours.   
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Chapter 1  
Understanding the influence of risk in athletic pacing: Insights 
from a multidisciplinary construct.  
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Abstract  
Individual perceptions of risk have been shown to influence athletic pacing strategy, where 
higher risk perceivers start slower than lower risk perceivers. However, it is not clear how risk 
has this effect within individuals. This literature review is directed at gaining further insight 
into what the risks are in a pacing context and how they may effect pacing behaviour; 
highlighting common associations between types of risk such as uncertainty, and how risks are 
acted upon in the form of affect. The second half of this review presents methods in which risk 
can be quantified, highlighting two key aspects of individual risk characterisation; risk 
behaviour, and risk attitude. The review then concludes by presenting a particular method 
(transcranial direct current stimulation; tDCS) that has gained recognition in both psychological 
and social science as a method for modulating risk characteristics, but has also seen recent 
introductions in the sport sciences. 
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Introduction 
 
Athletic pacing describes the way in which energy expenditure is regulated by athletes to 
complete an exercise task in the fastest possible time using all available energy resources (de 
Koning et al., 1999; Foster et al., 2003). Athletic pacing strategy or the way in which athletes 
distribute their work and energy resources throughout an exercise task significantly effects 
performance (Abbiss and Laursen, 2008). Well trained athletes employ specific pacing 
strategies by deciding how and when to invest their energy in an attempt to optimise 
performance (Smits et al., 2014). If an athlete invests too much energy at the start of an event, 
they risk early exhaustion; yet if too little energy is invested, they risk underachieving and 
failing to realise their performance potential (Renfree et al., 2014). This presents two 
contentious areas of the pacing literature in regard to (i) what the best pacing strategy is; and 
(ii) how athletes actually regulate their pace.  
Athletic pacing strategies 
 
Pacing strategy describes the self-selected approach or tactics that an athlete adopts from the 
beginning of an event (Roelands et al., 2013). Yet identifying what strategy is optimal or best 
has proven difficult. Optimal pacing has been described as pacing behaviour that is most 
physiologically efficient (Tucker et al., 2006). Theoretically, this reflects an even or constant 
power output / velocity; observations that are based on critical power models and 
mathematical laws of motion (di Prampero et al., 1979; Morton et al., 2006; Fukuba and 
Whipp, 1999). For shorter duration events; such as the 100 m sprint (~ 10 sec), all-out 
strategies are seen to produce superior performances (de Koning et al., 1999), primarily due to 
the large amount of time spend in the acceleration phase (Foster et al., 2004). However, as 
event distances and durations increase, the disparity between strategies used to achieve 
superior performances also increases. In 400 and 800 m running races ( ~ > 2 min), positive, 
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fast start strategies are observed (and modelled - Prendergast, 2002) to produce superior 
performances (Watt and Gunby, 2016). Yet in longer events (< 2 min), the need for energy 
conservation is evidently recognised (de Koning et al., 1999; Abbiss and Laursen, 2008). Under 
stable external conditions (heat, wind, terrain, course elevation), a constant pace is again 
believed to be optimal (de Koning et al., 1999; Thompson et al., 2003), yet this is not 
consistently adopted. For example; during 20 km, laboratory based (stable condition) cycling 
time trials, Mattern et al. (2001) demonstrated starting 15 % below average trial speed 
resulted in superior performance times in comparison to 15 % above or even pace. Thomas et 
al. (2012) described improved performance times when athletes tapered their starting pace 
displaying a parabolic (Reverse-J) shaped strategy. However, Renfree et al. (2012) showed 
superior performances resulted from even pace strategies with an end spurt in the final 10 % 
of the task. Notably, improved performances came as a result of increased average power 
during the even pace phase, yet end-spurt power outputs remained similar. 
Inferring an optimal pacing strategy is difficult, given that an optimal strategy is one that may 
allow an athlete to achieve the best possible performance. In this regard, discrepancies in an 
athletes’ experience and physical capabilities will play a significant role in determining the 
optimal individual pacing strategy. For example, a young amateur 10,000 m runner wanting to 
perform a 400 m running race may not be suited to the typically observed positive strategies 
adopted in elite athletic performances due to likely differences in athlete performance 
capabilities (Watt and Gunby, 2016). 400 m runners may have a natural advantage of speed 
and explosive power, whereas the amateur distance runner may have a natural advantage of 
endurance. Differences in adopted strategies can also be observed between elite athletes. 
Angus (2014) illustrated that two world record marathon performances were performed with 
contrasting strategies. In 2008, Haile Gebrselassie (runner one) ran a world record time of 
2:03:59, yet in 2011 and on the same course (Berlin), Patrick Makau (runner two) surpassed 
that with a time of 2:03:38; a 21 second improvement (equating to a 0.3 % reduction in time). 
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Runner one employed a variable pacing strategy where the oscillations exponentially 
increased, yet runner 2, a parabolic (U-shaped) strategy. While it is clear that a particular 
strategy may be commonly observed in a particular discipline or event parameter, it does not 
mean that it is the optimal strategy, and the best strategies are in fact ones tailored to an 
athletes’ strengths and weaknesses, relative to the task they face.  
Pace regulation 
 
Perhaps the largest debate in pacing literature concerns how athletes regulate their energy 
expenditure throughout self-paced exercise. The ability to select and maintain an appropriate 
pacing strategy is paramount to successful performance (de Koning et al., 2011). Athletes must 
first select a strategy that conforms to their process or outcome goals, but is also tailored to 
their strengths, performance capabilities and event conditions. The role of pace regulation is to 
ensure energy is distributed in a manner where by maximal performance is achieved, yet the 
body’s critical homeostasis is preserved (Tucker and Noakes, 2009). Current opinions regarding 
how athletes regulate energy expenditure vary in regard to the realm of consciousness 
regulatory control emanates from, yet many share similar primary mechanisms of regulation in 
regard to perceived exertion (Micklewright et al., 2016) - a psychophysiological cue of exercise 
intensity, thought to arise from integrated afferent feedback generated by peripheral 
physiological systems (St Clair Gibson et al., 2003 and 2006; St Clair Gibson and Noakes, 2004).    
The central governor model (Noakes et al., 2004) proposes a subconscious controller located in 
the human brain regulates the recruitment of motor units and acts as a homeostatic 
preservation system. Despite the influence this model has had, its conception is troubling, 
given there is no anatomical structure denoted to this controller region and it further proposes 
that exercise intensities cannot be taken beyond critical levels, yet catastrophic failure of 
physiological systems do occur in exercise performances (all be it they are rare). Conversely, 
the psychobiological model (Macora, 2010) proposes motor unit recruitment is a consciously 
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resided process where athletes select behaviours based upon the effort required and the 
desire to achieve the outcome from such a behaviour (Pageaux, 2014). In these, and other 
pacing models (Tucker, 2009; Garcin et al., 2012; de Koning et al., 2011), perceived exertion 
plays a primary role in deciphering if exercise intensities are suitable.  For example, the 
template matching model (Tucker, 2009) dictates that pace is altered to ensure perceptions of 
exertion match that of expected exertion, where if perceived exertion exceeds the forecasted 
exertion, the athlete will fatigue prior to end point. The application of such models to pacing 
behaviour has merit, given the scalar linear increase in perceived exertion so commonly 
witnessed in prolonged exercise (Crew et al., 2008; Faulkner et al., 2008; Joseph et al., 2008). 
The central governor, psychobiological and other models (Tucker, 2009; Garcin et al., 2012; de 
Koning et al., 2011; Edwards and Poleman, 2013), although may make reference to individual 
factors, fail to integrate how differences among individual athletes may influence pacing 
behaviour. Given the complex nature of pacing decisions (Renfree et al., 2014), it seems 
unlikely that athletic pacing is the product of a one-dimensional process dictated through one 
primary mechanism. Instead, it seems more plausible that a dynamic interaction between 
multiple processes, drawing upon various sources of information specific to the individuals’ 
nature is likely to direct pacing decisions (Micklewright et al., 2016). As such, our 
understanding of how athletes regulate pace in endurance exercise is still poorly understood 
and remains contested. However, a new direction of pacing is focusing on the impact that 
differences between athletes has on pace regulation and has highlighted the importance of 
cognitive development (Micklewright et al., 2012; Chinnasamy et al., 2013), previous 
experience (Foster et al., 2009; Micklewright et al., 2010) and most recently, risk perception 
traits (Micklewright et al., 2015). 
Greater levels of cognitive development in school children correspond to greater anticipation 
of exercise demands (Micklewright et al., 2012) which may be important when considering 
‘optimal’ strategies for younger athletes. Similarly, athletic experience seems to determine 
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how athletes interpret and subsequently act upon afferent feedback (Micklewright et al., 
2010), where previous experiences in similar event parameters and conditions are used to 
forecast expected exercise intensities and durations (Mauger et al., 2009). Such individual 
factors represent a development process whereby cognitive development or experience 
fluctuate over time. Micklewright et al. (2015) however demonstrated how athlete risk 
perception traits associate with pacing behaviours - a characteristic that may be expected to 
remain stable over time (Johnson et al., 2004; Matthews et al., 2009). Lower risk perceiving 
athletes were shown to adopt a significantly faster (~ 8 %) initial pace than their higher risk 
perceiving opponents. Despite this discrepancy in pace, no differences in perceived exertion 
were exhibited between risk groups, suggesting athletes experienced the exercise similarly. 
While a between subject’s design was needed in order to create different risk groups, it 
confounded the ability to infer how risk has this effect. Therefore, despite the intriguing insight 
provided into how differences between individual athlete risk perception traits influence pace 
behaviour, it still remains unclear as to how risk has this effect and warrants further 
investigation.  
The concept of risk and its prevalence in pacing 
 
Pacing choices made during exercise are recognised as involving varying degrees of risk 
(Renfree et al., 2014), yet the concept of risk within pacing has seen very little explicit 
research, despite being referenced to in a number of articles. The next section will introduce 
the concept of risk and apply it to a pacing context where possible in order to provide clarity 
on risk in pacing and provide avenues to research risk in a pacing context. 
In most contexts, the notion of ‘risk’ refers to a danger of unwanted or unfortunate events and 
is not a simple reference to uncertainty of possible outcomes. Risk, therefore, can be defined 
as the potential of [physical / social / financial] [harm / detriment / loss] due to a hazard within 
a particular time frame (Rohrmann, 2008). The term hazard subsequently refers to an event, 
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substance or situation that may become harmful for people, nature or human-made facilities; 
and represents a physical entity, while risk on the other hand is not. Risk is an inference about 
the implications of a hazard for the people exposed to it (Drottz-Sjöberg, 1991; Fischoff et al., 
1984; Renn, 1992; Taylor-Gooby, 2002). 
When applying such conceptualisations to a pacing context, athletic competition represents an 
environment plagued with hazards. A slippery running surface or hyper-thermic conditions (Ely 
et al., 2008) are evidently risk factors to an individual’s pace and performance; yet are often 
beyond the athletes control. An athlete is however in control over the decisions they make 
regarding how and when to invest their energy (Smits et al., 2014). The primary risk faced by 
athletes when regulating exercise intensity has been described as the likelihood of 
experiencing catastrophic physiological fatigue (CPF) (Renfree et al., 2014), a physical 
occurrence presenting serious homeostatic disturbances and health compromising effects to 
an athlete’s body and necessitating pace modification. However, experiencing catastrophe of 
any one physiological system represents perhaps the most extreme form of fatigue, something 
that is not common in athletic performances and may not be representative of the risks at the 
fore of athlete decision making. Instead, fatigue of a tapered nature (i.e. muscular fatigue due 
to reduced muscle glycogen) is more commonly experienced and perhaps a more common risk 
factor. Varying degrees of fatigue (both centrally and peripherally originated) do influence 
performance and pacing behaviour, yet the degree to which risk is appraised in such situations 
may be held in higher regard by different athletes. The way in which athletes act in accordance 
to this hazard presents further risk. For example, in a 5 km fun run, the primary goal of a well-
trained runner may be to achieve a personal best performance time. In doing so, they select a 
pacing strategy believed to provide them with the best possible (optimal) performance 
(Renfree et al., 2014) which will likely be performed to levels at or around critical physiological 
thresholds (lactate and ventilatory thresholds). A relatively fast start would ensure they remain 
on track to achieve their performance goal, yet the risk of experiencing early fatigue is 
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increased. If the athlete starts slower, they reduce the risk of early fatigue, yet increase the risk 
of failing to achieve their performance goals. Conversely, a novice runner attempting the same 
5 km fun run, whose goal is merely to complete the event, will be faced with the same hazard 
(fatigue), yet their risk factor may be different. Exerting themselves too much at any point in 
the race presents a risk of fatigue and possibly incompletion of the event. Under exertion 
however will reduce the risk of fatigue and still see goal attainment (event completion).  Pacing 
choices are further diversified when considering personal motives such as financial backing 
that is reliant on successful and high performance; or social standing with other friends and 
competitors.  
Examples provided above highlight just one of any number of situations where differences 
between athlete goals create a highly subjective environment in regard to risk appraisal and 
subsequent behaviour. The matter is further complicated when considering the value an 
athlete places on the end goal and their motivation to achieve it. Although it is important to 
understand what athletes must decide upon, perhaps a greater understanding of the types of 
risk faced by athletes may allow a more categorical understanding of how athletes behave in 
relation to risk.  
Types of risk 
 
The meaning of risk holds three central connotations; negative, positive and neural. Most risks 
refer to negative issues, yet risk can also represent uncertainty regarding choice outcome 
(representing a neutral connotation of the word). At times, even positive connotations of risk 
materialise in the form of a ’desired risk’ (e.g. a thrill through risky actions) (Breakwell, 2007; 
Rohrmann, 2003).  
Risks faced throughout endurance competition would appear to represent both negative and 
neutral risks. Despite athletes often being aware of the hazards they face in pursuit of maximal 
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performance, athletes do not often ‘desire’ to interact with hazards such as fatigue. Interacting 
with a hazard such as CPF very much represents a negative connotation of risk due to the 
homeostatic detriments it represents and pacing alterations necessitated. Athletes are further 
presented with neutral risks in the form of uncertainty (St Clair Gibson et al., 2006), where 
prospective decisions made regarding how much energy to expend in the early stages of an 
exercise task (Ulmer, 1996; Wittekind et al., 2009), and during the exercise task at the point of 
pace modification (St Clair Gibson et al., 2006). Ramifications of prospectively decided pacing 
decisions or online pace modifications only become apparent as the athletes’ progresses 
through the task. Subsequently, peripheral physiological feedback is received regarding the 
effect of exercise intensity and subsequent proximity to the hazard (CPF) (St Clair Gibson et al., 
2006). The effects of pacing decisions are not prospectively known, and therefore present an 
air of uncertainty regarding the outcome of the decision. Assessing how athletes behave when 
presented with the neutral risk of uncertainty in association with their pacing behaviour may 
provide further insight into how different facets of risk influence pace selection. 
An athlete’s awareness of their body’s physiological status is widely regarded to be generated 
from afferent peripheral signals received by the brain, conveying information regarding 
changes in physiological status due to workloads implemented (Tucker, 2009; Noakes, 2004). 
Correctly interpreting such signals are key if athletes are to understand if the current work rate 
is sustainable for the exercise duration. To do this, judgements and evaluations of afferent 
information are required to infer if the work rate presents a risk; for example, will the 
continuation at a specific work rate lead to fatigue prior to the end of the task, necessitating 
reductions in exercise intensity and present the risk failure to achieve pre-set goals. Therefore, 
the ability to accurately assess afferent information and the risks presented (fatigue, losing, 
goal attainment failure) is of high importance and may depend on an individual’s risk 
perception and risk tolerance characteristics (Taylor-Gooby, 2002). 
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What is risk perception? 
 
Risk perceptions are analyses of the world based on an individual’s experience and beliefs 
(Finucane & Holup, 2006; French et al., 2006; Slovic, 2000). Strictly speaking, risks cannot be 
perceived (like the mass of an object), as risk is a depiction of a reality that has not actually 
occurred; nonetheless, ‘risk perception’ has become the subject of the respective research 
topic. Risks are highly subjective and may be ‘perceived’ differently between individuals and 
are effected by three factor levels. Macro factors describe structural or institutional influences 
on an individual, whereas meso factors describe peer to peer or community influences. 
However, perhaps the most relevant factors to an individual’s regulation of their own pace will 
be micro, psychological level factors. 
Micro, psychological factors are composed of two sub-factors that guide individual risk 
perceptions. An individual’s level of knowledge forms the first micro level abstraction, where 
individuals who are less informed of a situation take fewer risks. Conversely, individuals with 
greater knowledge promote a tolerance and willingness to engage in risky situations (Huang et 
al., 2013) which has been linked to the level of personal control one feels over a situation that 
lessens anxiety and causes an individual to become more relaxed towards engaging in unsafe 
behaviours.  Such affirmations are also reflected in an athletic context where athletes are 
regarded to be objectively aware of exercise endpoint (Edwards and Polman, 2013). Such 
knowledge plays a vital role in the regulation of energy resources and the pacing strategy 
adopted (Baden et al., 2004), with knowledge of endpoint producing more aggressive and 
superior performances (Swart et al., 2009). Similarly, athletes with more experience of an 
exercise parameter have shown greater anticipation of exercise demands, displaying more 
aggressive pace behaviour (Mauger et al., 2009; Micklewright et al., 2010). Micklewright and 
colleagues (2010), who by deceiving experienced athletes of performance data and installing a 
new set of beliefs regarding their performance ability, observed successive exercise bouts 
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where athletes displayed increasingly riskier (faster and more aggressive) starting paces. 
Authors suggested mental representations aggregated from similar cycling experiences 
determined how cyclists interpreted afferent performance feedback data; therefore, the 
formation of a set of beliefs regarding previous experience was continually referenced to in 
the calculation of perceived exertion and pacing adjustments throughout subsequent races. 
This perhaps indicates that micro psychological factors play an influential role in risk based 
pacing decisions, where a set of installed belief systems promote a tolerance towards the risks 
inherent an activity though the false knowledge they acquired in previous experiences, leading 
to a greater propensity for taking risks. 
The second micro level abstraction is optimism bias, which describes an individual’s penchant 
beliefs that negative events are less likely to occur to them than to others; that they are more 
adept to avoiding the adverse effects of a negative event and therefore are more tolerable to 
risk (Weinstien, 1984). McCool et al. (2009) for example, demonstrated that individuals with 
higher risk tolerance levels and who took more risks were likely to underestimate one’s 
vulnerability to a threat and the severity of it; yet also overestimated the efficiency of one’s 
own ability to cope with the risk. Such optimistic biases may be reflected in inexperienced 
athletes, who lack effective anticipatory skills to apply knowledge regarding their performance 
capabilities to the task ahead (Micklewright et al., 2010). An optimistic bias may promote a 
tolerance towards the risks faced (early fatigue, reductions in work rate and losing the task) in 
belief that they will be able to achieve a superior performance, yet resulting in a more positive 
pacing strategy (Abbiss and Laursen, 2008). Psychological micro level factors may prove an 
important determinant of risk based pacing decisions and seems to centre on an athletes’ 
experience.  
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How risk perceptions guide behaviour 
 
Risk perceptions are thought to inform behaviour via two fundamental processes; risk-as-
feelings that refer to instinctive, emotive and intuitive reactions to danger and risk-as-analysis 
that refer to reasoning and logical scientific deliberation (Slovic et al., 2004). Risk-as-feelings 
are generally employed throughout daily life given most assessments of risk are done quickly 
and automatically through an experiential mode of thinking (Slovic et al., 2004). 
Strong visceral emotions such as fear and anger have been heavily linked with risk-as-feelings 
processing; where for example fear amplifies risk estimates and anger attenuates them (Lerner 
et al., 2003; Lerner and Keltner, 2000), yet such strong emotions are not common in every day 
risk assessments; especially when regulating exercise intensity. Softer feelings such as affect 
are instead thought to be experienced which guide judgements and decision making through 
feelings experienced with a given situation (Schwarz and Clore, 1988). Affect refers to the 
specific quality of the feeling state experienced, demarcating a positive or negative quality of a 
stimulus (Slovic et al., 2004). If feelings towards a situation are favourable (positive), risks are 
generally inferred as low, while the benefits as high; if feelings towards a situation are 
unfavourable (negative), risks are inferred as higher, while the benefits as lower (Alhakami & 
Slovic, 1994; Finucane et al., 2000).  
Affect has shown to play a major role in pace regulation, and is proposed as a dominant 
regulator of self-paced exercise (Baron et al., 2009) that may surpass the importance of 
perceived exertion (Renfree et al., 2012). Athletes experiencing a greater positive affect 
response from an exercise task are more likely to increase exercise intensity, whereas negative 
affect responses characterise a loss of motivation and see reductions in exercise intensity 
(Baron et al., 2009). Through the provision of information that supplements an increase or 
decrease in perceived benefits, individual judgements regarding perceived risks for a given 
situation have shown to change (Finucane et al. 2000). This indicates that affect is not a simple 
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response to prior analytical evaluations, but rather an online influential bias on judgement 
itself. To decide on an initial pace, athletes may use a risk-as-feelings based approach to utilise 
known event information such as knowledge of the end point and physical ability. Similarly, 
athletes with varying degrees of awareness and experience may implicitly inform online pacing 
decisions via emotional experiences associated with feelings of exertion, anxiety and other 
typically experienced emotions throughout the course of an exercise task (Faulkner et al., 
2008; St Clair Gibson et al., 2003; Parry et al., 2010). The role of affect in risk based pacing has 
not yet been investigated and may provide insight into the mechanism through which 
discrepancies in risk perception levels result in discrepancies in pace (Micklewright et al., 
2015). 
Summary 
 
The risk an athlete faces during pace regulation is the likelihood of experiencing a negative 
event. What this negative event constitutes however is highly subjective, yet often relates to 
experiencing fatigue and the consequences it poses on goal attainment (Renfree et al., 2014).  
The types of risks posed to an athlete represent both negative and neutral risks, due to (i) the 
dangers of hazard interaction; and (ii) the uncertainty surrounding the likelihood of this hazard 
interaction (St Clair Gibson et al., 2006). Formation of athlete risk appraisals are likely to be 
dictated by the athletes’ knowledge of event demands and personal performance capabilities, 
yet an athletes’ affective response to both negative and neutral risks may form a key 
component in risk based pacing decisions. Such affirmations may seem obvious, however it is 
important for them to be understood in collective, rather than separate entities given they are 
all highly interlinked.  It may therefore be important to understand if an athletes’ behaviour 
when presented with risk uncertainty corresponds to their pacing behaviour and if their 
affective response can provide insight into the potential mechanism behind risk related pacing 
discrepancies.    
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The following section will provide an overview on how individual risk characteristics are 
investigated to provide potential applications for risk based pacing research.  
 
Quantifying individual risk characteristics 
 
Quantifying an individual’s risk characteristics are achieved primarily through assessment of 
individual risk attitudes (Weber and Johnson, 2008). Risk attitudes reflect an individuals 
preferred level of risk and provide a detailed measure of what types of risk an individual is 
willing to accept and to what degree they will accept them. Measures of risk attitude fall into 
three categories (Weber and Johnson, 2008); two of which are subjective attitudes towards 
risk and behavioural measures of risk. A third category of risk attitude assessment describes 
personality traits related to risk, where individuals are asked to report personality traits 
related to risk taking. This however does not explicitly ascertain an individual’s attitude 
towards a proposed situation and therefore will not be discussed further.  Commonly used 
behavioural and risk attitude measures are presented in tables 1 and 2 respectively providing 
examples of their application within the literature to help inform their utility in application to 
pacing research.    
Risk attitude 
 
Risk attitudes have been likened to trait like properties of risk (Johnson et al., 2004), where 
attitudes towards risk and beliefs about enduring dispositions remain relatively stable within a 
specific domain (Matthews et al., 2009). Measures of risk attitude typically assess an 
individual’s attitude towards a proposed situation through means of questionnaire based 
responses. As such, most measures are similar in design, yet differ regarding the context and 
response to the proposed situation. The Choice Dilemmas Questionnaire (CDQ; Kogan and 
Wallach, 1964) and Risk Avoidance Scale (RAS; Shure and Meeker (1967) are good examples of 
such measures that query the individual directly regarding risky situations. Measures such as 
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the Domain Specific Risk Taking (DOSPERT) questionnaire (Blais and Weber, 2006) differ 
slightly and assess the decision maker’s appraisal of risk and benefit in order to infer their 
preferred level of risk. 
The CDQ consists of 12 brief descriptions of everyday hypothetical situations in which choices 
must be made between risky and non-risky options. For example, subjects in the CDQ are 
asked to decide what the odds would need to be for them to select a riskier option, such as 
quitting their modest and stable job for a higher paying job with an uncertain future. 
Participants provide a rating (out of 10) where a lower number indicates higher risk taking. The 
CDQ has typically been used to assess risk taking in individuals versus groups and analysing 
shifts in risk taking attitudes. The RAS similarly assess risk taking propensity and was developed 
through factor analyses of prior scales to develop a 19 item inventory. Participants are 
required to answer the provided questions as either ‘yes’, ‘cannot decide’ or ‘no’ (equivalent 
to 1, 2 and 3 points respectively). More ‘no’ responses indicate risk averse, while more ‘yes’ 
responses indicate risk seeking.  
The two instruments (CDQ and RAS) employ different configurations to assess risk taking 
propensity, yet are both well established and commonly used methods in older literature. The 
DOSPERT however is a relatively newer measure that assess both risk perception and 
propensity for risk taking over five domains. Using two, 30 item questionnaires with identical 
statements, participants are required to rate how risky the situation in that statement is, and 
how likely they are to engage in that situation using a seven-point scale (from ‘not at all risky’ 
to ‘extremely risky and ‘extremely likely’ to ‘extremely unlikely’). The DOSPERT has been used 
extensively since its conception and has shown high validity with various demographic groups  
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Table 1. Instruments to measure risk behaviour (risk preference) * 
 
Name Author Measure Scored 
Internal / external 
Validation ** 
Literature 
applications  
Angling Risk Task (ART) Pleskac (2008) Computer simulated task 
Average adjusted number of fish 
caught during relative simulated 
weather conditions. 
Yes / Yes n/a 
Balloon Analog Risk Task 
(BART) 
Lejuez et al. (2002) Computer simulated task 
Average number of pumps for 
balloons that didn’t explode. 
Yes / Yes 
Emotions and 
decisions: 
Heilman et al. 
(2010) 
Bomb Risk Elicitation Task 
(BRET) 
Crosetto & Filippin 
(2012) 
Computer simulated or 
paper based task 
Total number of boxes accrued. If 
‘theoretical’ bomb is in selected 
box, money accrued is lost. 
  
Yes / No n/a 
Columbia Card Task (CCT) Figner et al. (2009) Computer simulated task 
Total amount of gain or loss. Hot 
task = online changing risk styles. 
 Cold task = prior deliberative 
selection. 
 
Hot CCT internally 
validated 
Determinants of 
risk taking: Figner 
et al. (2009) 
Cups Task Levin & Hart (2003) 
Physical task (Levin & Hart 
(2003) 
Computer simulated task 
(Levin et al., 2007) 
Total number of risk choice 
categories chosen. 
Yes / No  
Risk experience on 
risk behaviour: 
Xue et al. (2010) 
 
Devil's Task Slovic (1966) Physical choice task 
Total number of switches before 
electing to stop 
Yes / No 
Narratives of risky 
decisions: 
Fernandez-Duque 
and Wifall (2007)  
Distribution Builder 
Goldstein et al. 
(2008) 
Computer simulated task 
Preferred probability distribution 
of retirement income as direct 
risk preference measure. 
n/a n/a 
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Dynamic Experiments for 
Estimating Preferences: 
Risk (DEEP Risk) 
Toubia et al. (2013) Binary choice 
Accumulation of binary choice 
outcomes 
Yes / Yes 
Economic risks: 
Schley and Peters 
(2014) 
Iowa Gambling Task 
Bechara et al. 
(1994) 
Computer simulated task 
Total simulated money upon 
completion + within game risk 
selection. 
Yes / Yes 
Risk taking and 
trait impulsivity: 
Upton et al. 
(2011) 
Multi-Outcome Risky 
Decision Task 
Lopes & Oden 
(1999) 
Paper based selection task 
Accumulation of risk choice 
categories chosen. 
No / No 
Decision making 
mechanics: 
Brandstatter et al. 
(2006) 
 
Reyna & Ellis Risk Task Reyna & Ellis (1994) Physical / visual choice task 
Accumulation of certainty and 
gamble choices 
n/a 
Choice and 
judgement in 
children: 
Schlottmann and 
Tring (2005) 
 
Risk-taking Propensity 
Measures 
MacCrimmon & 
Wehrung (1985) 
Likert scale 
Response value given indicates 
risk propensity. High score 
indicates likeliness to accept risks 
 
No / No  
Risky decision 
influences: Sitkin 
& Weingart (1995) 
 
Two-Outcome Risky 
Decision Task 
Lauriola et al. 
(2007) 
Binary choice 
Accumulated risk choices 
converting into ambiguity 
preference 
Yes / Yes 
Risk perception 
and emotion: 
Leikas et al. (2009) 
  
  
*Inventory list was partly informed by Columbia University’s Centre for Research on Environmental Decisions 
(http://www.sjdm.org/dmidi/Risk_Attitude.html ; Accessed 04 April 2016)  
** Internal and external validity reported in original publication unless otherwise stated. 
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Table 2. Instruments to measure risk attitudes* 
 
Name Author Measure Scored 
Internal / external 
Validation ** 
Literature 
applications  
Attitudes to Risk Taking Grol et al. (1990) Likert scale Combined score of all items. Yes / Yes 
Risk taking and 
tolerance: Tubbs 
et al. (2006) 
Business Risk Propensity 
Scale (BRPS) 
Sitkin & Weingart 
(1995) 
Likert scale 
Accumulation of questionnaire 
scores. Higher score demarcates 
increased propensity / perception 
of risk. 
n/a 
Employment 
turnover: 
Vardaman et al. 
(2008) 
Choice Dilemmas 
Questionnaire (CDQ) 
Kogan & Wallach 
(1964) 
Probability scale (1-10) 
Accumulated minimum 
probability of success from 
scenarios  
Yes / Yes 
Risk attitudes: 
Ghosh and Ray 
(1992) 
 
Cognitive Appraisal of Risky 
Events (CARE) 
Fromme et al. 
(1997) 
Likert scale 
Accumulated subscale responses 
(not at all – extremely likely) 
Yes / n/a 
Adolescent risk 
taking: Galvan et 
al. (2007) 
 
Domain Specific Risk Taking 
(DOSPERT) Scale  
Blais & Weber 
(2006) 
Likert scale 
Accumulated subscale responses 
(higher score = higher risk 
perception / propensity) 
Yes / Yes 
Decisions under 
ambiguity and 
risk: Lauriola et al. 
(2007) 
Passive Risk Taking Scale 
(PRT) 
Keinan & Bereby-
Meyer (2012) 
Likert scale 
Accumulation of passive risk 
subscale responses 
Yes / Yes n/a 
Risk Avoidance Scale (RAS) 
Shure & Meeker 
(1967) 
Three-point rating scale 
(1=Yes, 2=undecided, 3=no) 
Accumulation of subscale risk 
avoidance responses. 
Yes / n/a 
Manager and 
entrepreneur risk 
differences: Miner 
and Raju (2004) 
Risk Propensity Scale 
Nicholson et al. 
(2004) 
Likert scale 
Subscale means calculated. 
Higher score represents higher 
risk propensity. 
Yes / No 
Midwifery 
decision making: 
Styles et al. (2011) 
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Risk-taking Propensity Jackson et al. (1972) Likert scale 
Subscale means calculated. 
Higher score represents greater 
desire for risk. 
n/a n/a 
Risk-taking Propensity 
Measures 
MacCrimmon & 
Wehrung (1985) 
Choice ranking and Likert 
scale 
Accumulation of ranked choices 
and subscale responses 
n/a 
Risk taking in 
health setting: 
Harrison et al. 
(2005) 
Stimulating-Instrumental 
Risk Inventory 
Zaleskiewicz (2001) Likert scale 
Two types of risk taking: 
Stimulation and instrumental.  
Accumulation of scale scores. 
Yes / Yes n/a 
  
 
* Inventory list was partly informed by Columbia University’s Centre for Research on Environmental Decisions 
(http://www.sjdm.org/dmidi/Risk_Attitude.html ; Accessed 04 April 2016)  
** Internal and external validity reported in original publication unless otherwise stated. 
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(Weber et al., 2002; Blais and Weber, 2006), yet has also been used to illustrate differences in 
athletic pacing behaviour in relation to risk perception levels (Micklewright et al., 2015). 
The DOSPERT appears to hold a higher degree of utility in comparison to other risk attitude 
assessments presented above given the board domains and response accuracy of the assessment.  It 
would be interesting to understand if a particular domain, social risks for example, influenced pacing 
decisions where affirmations could then be applied towards risks of a particular nature influencing 
pace behaviours.  
Risk behaviour 
 
Behavioural measures of risk reflect more state like properties of the risk construct, where the 
stabilities in beliefs and behaviours typically expressed in trait measures (Johnson et al., 2004) are 
influenced by changes in state of mind and transient internal conditions (Eysenck and Eysenck, 
1980). As such, behavioural measures of risk assess an individual’s preference for risk established 
from actual choices made in a real or hypothetical task. Most behavioural measures of risk assess 
decisions made under uncertainty through either deliberate risk and benefit calculation (known as 
‘cold’ decision making) or emotional reactions generated from each option (known as ‘hot’ decision 
making) (Seguin et al., 2007; Shafir et al., 1993), or a combination of the two factors (Rosenbloom et 
al., 2012; Yang et al., 2012). Measures such as the Balloon Analogue Risk Task (BART; Lejuez et al., 
2002), Columbia Card Task (CCT; Figner et al., 2009) and the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT; Bechara et al., 
1994) are commonly used in behavioural literature. 
The BART is a measure of hot decision making where individuals are required to inflate a 
computerised balloon in return for a monetary based reward. The BART measures propensity 
towards risk by monetarily rewarding behaviours (balloon inflation) up until such behaviours result 
in poorer outcomes (balloon explosion and loss of accumulated money) (lejuez et al., 2002). In the 
BART, propensity for risk taking is measured from the onset, yet in tasks like the IGT, individuals 
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cannot express risk propensity until they have learnt the risks. The IGT also measures hot decision 
making processes through the selection of 100 cards from four separate decks. The goal is to 
maximise profit; with each deck containing various magnitudes of risk (i.e. reward / loss). 
Participants are unaware of the discrepancies in risk between the decks until they progress through 
the task, and therefore require online risk formations. The CCT is the newest of the three tasks and 
assesses both hot and cold decision making through the selection of cards with either positive or 
negative values. Participants are told prior to the task the number of ‘loss’ and ‘win’ cards. In the hot 
task, participants turn over cards one by one and choose when to stop. In the cold task, participants 
prospectively choose the number of cards they want to select without receiving feedback until the 
end. 
Given the complex nature of decisions made throughout an exercise task and the consequential 
actions taken (Renfree et al., 2014), pacing may also be considered a measurable human risk taking 
behaviour. In this regard, understanding if more generalised measures of risk behaviour correspond 
to a complex risk behaviour such as pacing holds a high degree of utility in our ability to understand 
the specific nature of the risk pacing relationship, and will contribute to athlete profiling. The BART, 
IGT and CCT all measure unique, non-overlapping decision making processes (Buelow and Blaine, 
2015) and may all provide different insights to how risk and reward is processed by individual 
athletes. For example, while pacing is understood to incorporate degrees of uncertainty (St Clair 
Gibson et al., 2006), athletes are also believed to be aware of the risks faced from the onset of 
exercise and make their choices accordingly. The BART similarly measures risk taking behaviour 
under uncertainty from the onset of the task and it may be expected that athletes displaying 
propensity for risk taking under uncertainty in the BART, display greater risk taking behaviours in 
their athletic task (i.e. faster relative starting pace). 
As athletes progress through their exercise task, they are believed to become increasingly aware of 
the outcome of prospective pacing decisions and the degree of uncertainty is reduced (St Clair 
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Gibson et al., 2006). The IGT reflects a similar learning process where individuals become 
increasingly aware of the risks posed as the task progresses.  It may be expected that behaviours 
presented in the IGT (perhaps a risk adverse response to increased loss cards drawn) corresponds to 
that of a negative event in a pacing task (such as a high RPE far from event completion). The IGT may 
provide further utility for understanding between trial risk-pacing associations, where behavioural 
responses to negative events in the IGT may correspond to differential pacing strategies adopted in 
subsequent pacing tasks.  
To form coherent representations of an athlete’s risk profile, using multiple risk based decision 
measures is advised as no single risk measure fully assesses the risk construct (Buelow and Blaine, 
2015). The DOSPERT has already been used in a pacing context (Micklewright et al., 2015) and has 
proven effective in providing associations between levels of risk attitude and pacing behaviours, yet 
may be able to provide more domain specific insights into risk associations. Similarly, corresponding 
general risk behaviour measures such as the BART or IGT to a pacing context will allow a greater 
understanding of the relationship between the learning of risk and uncertainty with pacing 
behaviours. It is also interesting to note that pacing is employed to attain a goal that holds a degree 
of value. Behavioural risk measures also present similar dichotomy’s whether it be a monetary value 
or an arbitrary score that the individual is seeking, it would be interesting to understand if pace 
corresponds to the value achieved in the generalised behavioural risk measure.  
 
Modulating risk characteristics 
 
The depth of risk research has undoubtedly been extended through the use of risk modulating 
methods. The ability to alter an individual’s risk characteristics allows causality to be inferred with 
respect to how risk influences particular behaviours in particular situations. While risk is generally 
inferred as a personality trait (Johnson et al., 2004), which describes stabilities in behaviour and 
beliefs about enduring dispositions (Matthews et al., 2009); expressions of such traits are however 
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subject to transient states, where changes in state of mind or internal conditions (Eysenck and 
Eysenck, 1980) may cause positive or negative transient states of risk. In light of this, a variety of 
ways exist where risk can be modified, through both invasive and non-invasive methods. Illegal 
recreational compounds such as marijuana, cocaine and amphetamine have shown to elicit risk 
taking behaviour modulations (Bartzokis et al., 2000; Lane et al., 2005). Similarly, the use of legal 
narcotics such as alcohol see increases in risk taking behaviour. Such methods describe an invasive, 
globalised and substance dependent amplification of risk characteristics. Non-invasive measures 
have also been used to good effect in modulating individual risk, such as the subconscious priming of 
risk taking attitudes (Erb et al., 2002). However, perhaps the most promising method is neuro-
cortical stimulation. Neuro-stimulation based techniques have been used to elicit both increases and 
in decreases in various facets of the risk concept depending on stimulation parameters (Levasseur-
Moreau and Fecteau, 2012). Priming risk behaviours has seen little explicit attention in this 
literature, whereas neuromodulation has. Neuromodulatory techniques have helped underpin 
causal relationships between specific brain regions and decision making behaviours.   
Here we present one particular method that has gained significant recognition for its use within 
behavioural sciences and has seen recent introductions to pacing research (Okano et al., 2013; 
Angius et al., 2015). Transcranial direct current stimulation (tDCS) is a safe, non-invasive, non-
pharmacological and cost effective electrical stimulation technique proven to induce behaviour 
modifications. 
tDCS delivers acute polarity dependant modulations to the resting membrane potential of cephalic 
neurons. This is achieved through the application of a weak, direct current applied at the scalp 
through a minimum of a two electrode montage; one anode and one cathode. Beneath the anode 
(AN), resting neural tissue is depolarised and therefore increases sensitivity to action potentials. 
Conversely, beneath the cathode (CA) neural tissue is hyperpolarised (Nitsche et al., 2008). 
Knowledge surrounding optimal tDCS stimulation parameters is still in its infancy and varies from 0.5 
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- 2 mA in intensity, and 3 - 20 min in duration between studies. Applications of tDCS within 
behavioural research generally target the prefrontal cortex (PFC) of the human brain; an area 
critically associated with decision making. In particular, the dorsolateral area (dl) of the prefrontal 
cortex (dlPFC) has been shown to play a major role in the maintenance and manipulation of multiple 
sources of information relative to decision making (Krawczyk, 2002; Kroger et al., 2002), as well as 
monitoring the status of competing decision options (Krawczyk, 2002).   
 (For simplicity, tDCS montages are described as, for example: ‘AN left / CA right’ for anodal 
stimulation of the left and cathodal stimulation of the right dlPFC)   
Applications of tDCS to the dlPFC have been shown to influence risky lifestyle choices; such as 
reduced food (Fregni et al. 2008) and alcohol cravings (Boggio et al., 2008) along with increased 
cautiousness during driving simulations (Beeli et al., 2008a) following AN left or AN right. Similar 
reductions in risky behaviours have been seen in tasks designed to infer more specific brain-
behaviour relationships and the types of risk individuals are willing to accept. Using the BART, 
Fecteau et al. (2007a) showed a reduction in risky decisions following AN left / CA right. Less balloon 
pumps were made and less money was accrued, however the opposite montage showed 
comparable behavioural changes. Similarly, this time using ‘The Risk Task’, Fectaeu et al. (2007b) 
showed increases in risk adverse responses when stimulating CA left / AN right.  
Differential risk behaviours have been noted when using tDCS. Using the CCT; smokers and non-
smokers exhibited a decrease in affect-based risk seeking following AN left / CA right (Pripfl et al., 
2013), yet when the opposite tDCS montage was applied (CA left / AN right), deliberative risk 
decisions increased. Boggio et al. (2010a) similarly demonstrated increases in high risk behaviours 
following AN left / CA right; and Hecht et al. (2010) (using the same electrode montage), 
demonstrated an increase in impulsive decision making. When using subjects with habitual 
substance abuse, Boggio et al. (2010b) demonstrated marijuana users increased propensity for risk 
during The Risk Task following CA left / AN right, yet the opposite montage (AN left / CA right) 
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produced varying responses. Similarly, cocaine dependent users were shown to increase risk taking 
during the Game of Dice task, following AN left / CA right (Goroni et al., 2014); whereas CA left / AN 
right decreased risk in both cocaine dependant and control subjects. However, both montages 
demonstrated decreased risk taking when assessed via the BART. 
The above literature presents compelling evidence for the use of tDCS on the dlPFC as a risk 
modulating technique. Benefits of using a technique such as tDCS are that modulations of functional 
brain activity can be localised to the area of the brain that is critically associated to the relative 
psychological function. Substance induced behavioural changes however will generate a more global 
modulation of functional brain activity, and may impact on motor and ocular functions. However, it 
must also be recognised that tDCS has been used to target the dlPFC with similar stimulation 
parameters but to elicit other psychological functions. Pain perception and thresholds (Boggio et al., 
2008b), depression (Kalu et al., 2012) and planning ability (Dockery et al., 2009) represent a selection 
of uses tDCS has been implemented for when targeting the dlPFC. It is therefore imperative to 
consider that a modulation of dlPFC activity will modulate all of the above and perhaps more 
functions which may collectively impact on an athletes’ pace and performance when applied in a 
pacing context. Yet it is also important to consider that modulated risk behaviour may simply be the 
product of altered psychological functions, such as pain perception.  
In light of this, it is clear that not all effects of tDCS modulations are homogenous with regard to the 
modulation of risk achieved; for example, AN left / CA right have shown to increase (Boggio et al., 
2010a) and decrease (Fecteau et al., 2007a) various facets of risk. This can in part be explained by 
differences in population age and genders between studies but also the use of various assessment 
tools with different values; the appraisal of which may have been influenced by the tDCS 
intervention. However, another likely explanation for this is the variability in response to tDCS. While 
tDCS has been shown to induce polarity dependent modulations to neural tissue, the direction of 
that change has seen much variation due to a host of inter and intra individual factors. Variation in 
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anatomy, neurochemistry, genetics, psychological status, functional organisation of local circuits, 
development and ageing represent a selection of intra and inter individual factors that have shown 
to influence the direction and degree of modulation achieved by using tDCS (li et al., 2015).  
Understanding the modulatory effect of tDCS 
 
Matching age and sex both within and between experimental groups will help to account for inter-
individual variability in response to tDCS by limiting developmental and biological differences. Yet 
this does not fully account for intra-individual variation. Therefore, to understand what effect the 
tDCS intervention has on an individual, it is imperative to check the neurophysiological response 
using some form of neuroimaging to measure the neural activity of targeted tissue. By doing so, an 
inference can be made regarding the effectiveness of the tDCS intervention.  
Techniques currently available for non-invasive mapping of brain activity are divided largely into two 
groups depending on the underlying mechanisms of operation (Shibasaki, 2008). One group relies on 
electrophysiological, and the other on haemodynamic principles.  Electrophysiological methods 
include electroencephalography (EEG) and magnetoencephalography (MEG); while haemodynamic 
methods include positron emission tomography (PET), single-photon emission computed 
tomography (SPECT), magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) and near-infrared spectroscopy (NIRS). 
Haemodynamic changes correspond well to neuronal activity (neurovascular coupling), which is 
especially reflected in the synaptic environment rather than spiking activity (Mangia et al., 2008) and 
therefore provides an effective surrogate measure of neuronal activity. All of the above methods are 
applicable to quantifying the effect of tDCS response in some form (Kwon et al., 2008; Marshall et 
al., 2011), yet typically require the individual to remain motionless during measurements. MEG, MRI 
and PET / SPECT scanning are all large, costly methods that require the individual to be fitted to the 
imaging modality and are highly sensitive to motion artefact. EEG and NIRS on the other hand are 
comparatively more compact, portable and relatively cost effective systems that are applied to the 
individual. EEG provides a sensitive frequency and amplitude based measure of evoked potentials 
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related to a sensory stimulus yet is highly susceptible to motion and ocular artefacts. NIRS 
meanwhile offers relative and absolute measures of haemodynamic properties and is relatively 
robust to motion artefact.  
NIRS as a tDCS modulation check 
 
Here we present the case for the use of NIRS as a modality to understand the modulatory effects of 
tDCS. tDCS induced modulations of functional brain activity have shown to reflect in haemodynamic 
properties where anodal stimulation increases oxygenated haemoglobin (Merzagora et al., 2010) 
and cerebral blood flow (Zeng et al., 2011). Two commonly used near-infrared spectroscopic 
techniques provide unique observational platforms to infer modulations to functional brain activity. 
The modified beer-lambert law (MBLL) generates sensitive and relative changes in oxy and deoxy-
haemoglobin (Boas et al., 2001). Spatially resolved spectroscopy (SRS) however produces absolute 
values of tissue oxygenation and blood volume and provides a unique opportunity to remove 
optodes to apply an intervention, and then re-apply the optodes to record any modulatory effect 
(Suzuki et al., 1999; Myers et al., 2009). NIRS has an excellent temporal resolution ( ~ 1 ms) (Ferrari 
and  Quaresima, 2012), yet is generally regarded as having poor spatial resolution which primarily 
due to the limited depth of cortical tissue that NIRS can penetrate (Ye et al., 2009). This depth 
limitation is due to an increased scattering of near-infrared light in deeper cortical tissue (Ye et al., 
2009), however, for outer layers of the cerebral cortex, NIRS provides reasonable spatial resolution ( 
~ 1 cm) (Ferrari and  Quaresima, 2012) making make it suitable to measure dlPFC activity. 
NIRS has been used previously to document cerebral oxygenation and blood volume changes during 
submaximal (Ide et al., 1999), maximal (Gonzales-Alonso et al., 2004; Ogoh et al., 2005) and 
supramaximal exercise (Shibuya et al., 2004); and also neurocognitive functions associated with 
exercise (Cui et al., 2011; Endo et al., 2013; Yanagisawa et al., 2010). This further bolsters the utility 
of NIRS in a pacing context and may allow for monitoring of tDCS induced modulations in real time 
during an exercise task; a function that is not feasible with EEG, MRI, PET / SPECT or MEG.  
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Conclusions 
The influence of risk in pace regulation is intriguing, we understand that risk is associated with the 
way an athlete regulates their pace during an exercise task, yet our understanding of how risk has 
this effect remains unclear. In this review, we have highlighted how athletes may face different 
types of risk (negative, neutral) and an athletes’ affective states may provide insight into the 
mechanism through which risk influences pace behaviour.  The inclusion of various risk 
quantification measures will further diversify the nature of our understanding of the risk-pacing 
relationship through the use of risk attitude and behaviour measures with different risk inference 
properties. 
The use of attitude and behavioural measures of risk will deepen our understanding of risk in pacing, 
yet the use of a risk modification technique such as tDCS provides a unique opportunity to infer 
causality with regard to how a change in risk changes pace behaviour. By applying tDCS to an area 
such as the dlPFC, we could expect an athletes risk taking behaviour to change, and for this change 
in risk characteristics to correspond to changes in pace behaviour.    
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Chapter 2  
The influence of individual risk characteristics on athlete pacing 
behaviour: a tDCS study.  
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Abstract 
Objective: To investigate how athlete risk attitude and behaviour characteristics influence pacing 
behaviour using transcranial direct current stimulation (tDCS) to alter dlPFC functional activity and 
modulate athlete risk characteristics.  
Methods: A two-way within and between subjects’ design was employed. Thirteen experienced 
male cyclists performed four, 16 km self-paced cycling time trials in the fastest time possible. RPE 
and affect were collected at every 2 km. The BART was used to measure athlete risk behaviour 
characteristics, and the DOSPERT to measure risk attitude. tDCS was used to modulate risk 
characteristics through modulated dlPFC functional activity and NIRS was used to check the 
neurophysiological modulation of tDCS.  
Results: No difference between higher and lower risk groups for pace, RPE, hazard score or affect; 
although higher and lower risk groups display differential starting pace variance. tDCS has no effect 
on dlPFC blood volume following tDCS intervention and there were no changes in risk, pace, RPE, 
hazard score or affect between conditions. Increased BART risk taking score between sham tDCS and 
active tDCS conditions negatively correlated with changes in relative starting (0-2 km) pace, (r10 = - 
0.688, P = 0.03), RPE (r11 = -0.614, P = 0.05) and hazard score (r11 = -0.614, P = 0.05), but not affect. 
No association was seen between a change in DOSPERT score and pace, RPE, hazard score or affect. 
Conclusions: Risk does not influence pace at a group level yet initial pacing variance between higher 
and lower risk groups appears to vary. Changes in BART risk taking behaviour negatively associates 
with starting pace, perhaps due to differences in value computation between the tasks indicating 
differences between individuals influences initial pace behaviour. 
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Introduction  
 
Athletic pacing describes a process whereby athletes regulate the distribution of energy resources 
throughout an exercise task in order to achieve maximal performance while preserving body 
homeostasis (de Koning et al., 1999; Foster et al., 2003; Tucker and Noakes, 2009; Roelands et al, 
2013). The specific nature by which athletes perform this regulation is hotly debated, yet it is widely 
agreed that an athletes’ perception of exertion plays a major role in pace regulation. Perceived 
exertion is a psychophysiological cue of exercise intensity, thought to arise from integrated afferent 
feedback received by the brain from peripheral physiological systems (St Clair Gibson et al., 2003 and 
2006). The template matching model proposed by Tucker (2009) suggests pace is regulated to 
maintain a scalar linear increase in perceived exertion throughout exercise, where if perceived 
exertion drops below, or exceeds that of forecasted exertion, efferent drive and pace will be 
modified. The rather more controversial central governor model (CGM; Noakes et al., 2004) 
proposes an unspecified subconscious brain region regulates pace by altering motor unit 
recruitment and inducing perceptions of exertion to ensure physiological systems never exceed 
critical thresholds. The hazard score model (de Koning et al., 2011) instead uses the perceived 
exertion scale in a metric with the fraction of event distance remaining to generate a ‘hazard score’. 
A score below 1.5 indicates a positive change in pace, whereas between 1.5 and 3 no change, and a 
score above 3 indicates a negative change in pace. Explicitly recognised in this hazard score model is 
the risk of accruing a high score at the start of an exercise task, indicating the exercise intensity is 
not sustainable for the event duration.  
The selection and maintenance of an effective pacing strategy is vital for success, particularly during 
the early stages of an exercise task. If an athlete starts too fast, they risk exhausting metabolic 
reserves too early and fatiguing (Thompson et al., 2003); yet starting too slow risks underperforming 
(Abbiss and Laursen, 2008). The notion of risk; where by the likelihood of an unwanted or 
unfortunate event occurring (Rohrmann, 2008) is explicitly referenced to in much pacing literature, 
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yet only one study has explicitly investigated the influence of risk on pace behaviour. Micklewright et 
al. (2015); investigating how different levels of risk perception between athletes influences pacing 
behaviour, highlighted that lower risk perceiving athletes adopt faster initial pacing strategies than 
higher risk perceivers ( ~ 8 % ). Despite discrepancies in initial pace, performance remained similar 
between risk groups, as did perceived exertion, suggesting athletes experienced the exercise 
similarly. Due to the similarities in subjective scores between risk groups, and the nature of the 
study (between-subjects), it is hard to infer how risk has this effect in individual athletes yet 
highlights the nature by which individual differences may influence pace selection, an area that 
seems to have been overlooked in previous pacing literature.  This study is therefore aimed at 
furthering our understanding of this association by employing a mixed study design and assessing 
how differences in risk characteristics, both within and between condition influences pace selection.   
Appraisals of risk form just one component of the risk concept and it is important to note that these 
appraisals must be acted upon. As such, understanding how risk taking behaviour associates with 
pace selection will deepen our understanding of how differences in athlete risk characteristics 
influence pace behaviour; after all, the act of pacing can also be viewed as a measure of risk taking. 
Micklewright et al. (2015) used the domain specific risk taking (DOSPERT) scale to quantify athlete 
risk perceptions. The DOSPERT is a self-report questionnaire that requires individuals to report how 
likely they are to engage in, and how risky they appraise, a given situation to be. The DOSPERT 
reflects trait like properties of risk perception and propensity attitudes that are seen to remain 
stable within respective risk domains (Blais and Weber, 2006). The balloon analogue risk task (BART; 
Lejuez et al., 2002) - a behavioural measure of risk taking - requires individuals to inflate a 
computerised balloon in return for a monetary reward, yet if the balloon explodes, all money 
accrued for that balloon is lost (a negative risk). The BART measures risk taking behaviour when 
presented with uncertainty (a neutral risk) and may correspond well with pacing behaviour given the 
uncertainty incorporated into pacing decisions (St Clair Gibson et al., 2006). Uncertainty is believed 
to be at its greatest at the start of an event given the magnitude of influences that may occur during 
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the task. It may therefore be expected for the two tasks to correspond; with high BART risk taking 
reflecting in high risk pace decisions (fast start).  
In order to understand how a change in risk influences athlete pacing we propose to use transcranial 
direct current stimulation (tDCS), a neurostimulatory technique proven to alter human risk taking 
behaviours (Levasseur-Moreau and Fecteau, 2012). Through the application of two electrodes (one 
anode and one cathode), a weak electrical current is passed through targeted cortical tissue, 
modulating the resting membrane potential of cephalic neurons (Nitsche et al., 2008). Below the 
anodal electrode, functional activity is facilitated (depolarised); yet below the cathode, it is inhibited 
(hyperpolarised) (Nitsche et al., 2008). When used to target the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex 
(dlPFC) - an area associated with higher cognitive functions such as action planning (Frith and Dolan, 
1996), value computation (Sokol-Hessner et al., 2012) and working memory (Frith and Dolan, 1996) –  
both risk adverse (Pripfl et al., 2013) and risk seeking (Boggio et al., 2010a) behaviours have been 
induced. Of particular interest is the increased risk taking behaviours exhibited following anodal 
tDCS to the left dlPFC (Boggio et al., 2010a; Hecht et al., 2010; Goroni et al., 2014) and provides an 
opportunity to modulate athlete risk taking behaviours. 
It is reasonable to expect tDCS of the dlPFC to induce risk based behavioural changes given its uses in 
behavioural literature (Levasseur-Moreau and Fecteau, 2012), however, it must also be recognised 
that tDCS has been used to target the dlPFC for other means such as pain perception (Boggio et al., 
2008b) and planning ability (Dockery et al., 2009). Therefore, excitability changes in this area may 
induce wider modulations to psychological processes and perceptual systems that may inform 
athlete decision making. Furthermore, an innate amount of variability is understood to exist in the 
direction and degree of response from tDCS interventions both between, and within individuals (Li et 
al., 2015). Therefore, we will check the modulatory effect of tDCS by using the Spatially Resolved 
Near-Infrared Spectroscopy (SR-NIRS) optical imaging technique to assess changes in cerebral blood 
volume, a surrogate measure of functional brain activity (Grubb et al., 1974; Leenders et al., 1990; 
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Davies et al., 2015). (A description of the applicability of SR-NIRS to assess a tDCS modulation is given 
in the methods section under the ‘Spatially Resolved – Near Infrared Spectroscopy (SR-NIRS) for 
measuring tDCS modulated functional brain activity’ section) 
Athlete risk perceptions are understood to associate with pacing behaviours (Micklewright et al., 
2015), yet it is not clear how risk has this effect in individual athletes. In this study we will assess 
how athlete risk perception, propensity and taking characteristics associate with pacing behaviours 
both within and between athletes. Perceived exertion and hazard score will be measured to 
understand if perceptions of exercise intensity differ between levels of risk. We will also measure 
athlete affective states; the specific quality of feeling experienced (positive or negative) from a 
stimulus (Slovic et al., 2004). Affect is instrumental in the formation of risk appraisals (Alhakami and 
Slovic, 1994; Finucane et al., 2000) and has been associated with pace selection (Baron et al., 2009). 
Negative affect promotes higher risk perceptions and is associated with decreased exercise intensity; 
whereas greater positive affect lowers risk perceptions and corresponds with higher exercise 
intensities (Alhakami and Slovic, 1994; Finucane et al., 2000; Baron et al., 2009). We hypothesise 
that, (A) higher risk taking, lower risk perception, and higher risk propensity athletes will adopt a 
faster initial pace and experience greater positive affect than lower risk takers, higher risk perceivers 
and lower risk propensity athletes, yet RPE and hazard score will remain similar between groups in 
accordance with previous research (Micklewright et al., 2015). We further hypothesise that, (B) an 
increase in risk taking behaviour, risk propensity and decrease in risk perception will correspond to 
an increased initial pace; and RPE, hazard score and affect will positively correspond with these 
changes.    
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Methods  
 
Participants 
Thirteen experienced male cyclists (age, 33.5 ± 6.7 yrs; stature, 178.6 ± 5.7 cm; mass, 73.7 ± 9.8 kg) 
without a history of neurological or psychiatric disorders and naive to tDCS were recruited in this 
study. The study was approved by the University of Essex Ethics Committee and all subjects provided 
written informed consent and completed a transcranial direct current stimulation screening 
questionnaire before taking part. 
Design  
A two-way within and between subject’s experimental design was employed where participants 
were required to visit the laboratory on four separate occasions separated by a minimum of 48 
hours. Visits one (fam1) and two (fam2) served as familiarisation trials where subjects first 
completed either the BART (fam1) or the DOSPERT (fam2), followed by a five-minute self-paced 
warm up. When instructed, subjects then completed a 16 km self-paced time trial and were 
instructed to complete it in the fastest time possible. Visits three and four consisted of exactly the 
same procedures, except that the type of tDCS intervention changed (explained below in the 
‘Transcranial Direct Current Stimulation’ section). Firstly, baseline bilateral dlPFC THI was measured 
for three minutes, followed by thirteen minutes of either active or sham anodal tDCS to the left 
dlPFC (counter balanced). Following tDCS, post intervention bilateral dlPFC THI was measured for a 
further three minutes which was then followed by the completion of the BART and DOSPERT risk 
tasks. Subjects then completed a five-minute self-paced warm up, followed by the completion of a 
16 km self-pace time trial. Participants were instructed to complete the trial in the fastest time 
possible. Subjective scores (RPE and affect) were taken at every two kilometre interval. Risk 
measures (BART and DOSPERT) were used on different familiarisation trials in order to limited 
confounding learning effects of the tasks. 
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Figure 1. Experimental overview and schematic illustration of experimental procedures 
 
Spatially Resolved – Near Infrared Spectroscopy (SR-NIRS) – Equipment and Data Collection 
SR-NIRS is a depth resolved optical imaging technique that shines near-infrared light into targeted 
tissue and processes the attenuated light as it re-emerges to generate a tissue haemoglobin index 
(THI). Changes in bilateral dlPFC THI were continuously recorded using a NIRO-200 
spectrophotometer (Hamamatsu Photonics KK, Tokyo, Japan). This spectrophotometer is a 3-
wavelength, continuous wave system that uses the spatially resoled spectroscopy (SRS) method to 
determine THI. Near-infrared light is delivered via a fibre optic bundle at 778, 812 and 850 nm 
wavelengths and terminates at an emission probe.  A detection probe is situated 40 mm from the 
emission probe and houses two aligned photograph detectors, separated by 4 mm. This emission / 
detector probe coupling forms one channel. Two channels were used; channel 1 was placed over the 
left (F3) and channel 2 was placed over the right (F4) dlPFC according to the 10-20 international 
system of marker placements (Klem, 1999). Data were collected at 6 Hz and processed in real time 
using a customised code implemented in Matlab 7.0.4 software (The MathWorks Inc., MA, USA). To 
reduce motion artefact, participants were asked to minimize head and body movements and were 
given instruction to breathe gently and regularly whilst resting. Offline data processing was 
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performed using a customised code implemented in Matlab 8.6.0 software to reduce data to a 2 Hz 
sample rate and allow for the removal of outliers and smoothing of data. 
Spatially Resolved – Near Infrared Spectroscopy (SR-NIRS) for measuring tDCS modulated 
functional brain activity 
tDCS modulated brain activity reflects in the haemodynamics of the targeted tissue. Anodal tDCS 
shows to increase oxygenated haemoglobin (Merzagora et al., 2010) and regional cerebral blood 
flow (Zeng et al., 2011). The THI measure generated from SR-NIRS is a scaled measure of tissue blood 
volume generated through a metric of a constant, but unknown tissue parameter (Suzuki et al., 
1999) and the real blood volume signal strength (Myers et al., 2009). Blood volume is often used in 
conjunction with cerebral blood flow to measure basal brain activity (Grubb et al.,1974; Fox and 
Raichle, 1986; Leenders et al., 1990) and reflects the supply and demand of oxygen. The use of blood 
volume is typically as a surrogate measure of blood flow (Grubb et al., 1974), and therefore is a 
surrogate measure of functional brain activity. Given THI is a scaled measure of the real blood 
volume, it is represented in arbitrary units, yet provides an indirect measure of blood flow and 
vasomotor activity in observed tissue (Davies et al., 2015; Franceschini et al., 1999) and may allow 
for the quantification of tDCS induced haemodynamic changes. SR-NIRS has an advantage over other 
trend NIRS measurements in that the spatially resolved method results in an absolute number, 
requiring no baseline measurement. This means in principle that the NIRS optodes can be removed 
before – and replaced after – tCDS treatment without compromising the NIRS measurement of tDCS 
induced blood volume changes (and hence enable measurement of a surrogate of changes in 
functional brain activity).  
Transcranial Direct Current Stimulation 
 
tDCS was applied using a battery-driven electrical stimulator (HDCstim, Neuronika, Milano, Italy) 
connected to a pair of thick (3 mm) saline-soaked synthetic surface sponge electrodes (35 cm2 Each) 
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placed on the scalp. For active stimulation, the anode was placed over the F3 position and the 
cathode was placed over the contralateral supraorbital area in accordance to the 10-20 international 
marker system. This electrode montage is designed to elicit an upregulation in the left dlPFC only 
due to the reference electrode (cathode) placement. Electrodes were held in place with rubber head 
bands and then held firmly to the scalp using a large, thin rubber head band. Active stimulation 
lasted for 13 minutes at a constant current of 1 mA (with a 30 second phase in / phase out transition 
for a total stimulation time of 840 seconds); total current density equalled 0.02857 mA/cm2. These 
stimulation parameters have been used previously to elicit sustained facilitatory effects for one hour 
(Monte-Silva et al., 2013). The sham stimulation protocol mirrored active stimulation parameters, 
yet stimulation ceased following the 30 second phase in period. This has been shown as an effective 
method of providing tDCS sensations without inducing any significant modulatory effect allowing for 
effective placebo trials (Gandiga et al., 2006).  
 
Risk Measures  
 
The Balloon Analogue Risk Task (BART) (Lejuez et al., 2002) employed in this study required 
participants to inflate a computerised balloon presented on a laptop in front of them by pressing a 
key on the response pad to select the ‘inflate’ button on screen. Each balloon could explode at any 
point between 1 and 128 pumps with an average explosion point of 64 pumps. Each pump earnt 
£0.05 which was stored in a ‘temporary bank’. At any point, the participant could stop pumping and 
collect the money, transferring the accumulated money from that balloon to a ‘permanent bank’. In 
contrast, when a balloon explodes, the accumulated temporary money is lost and the next trial 
(balloon) begins. Information regarding explosion points were not provided to participants. The 
variable of interest is the ‘total number of adjusted pumps’ (i.e. the number of pumps per balloon 
for balloons that did not explode). 
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The Domain Specific Risk Taking (DOSPERT) questionnaire (Blais and Weber, 2006) employs a seven 
point Likert-scale questionnaire that consists of two identical sets of 30 questions. Participants were 
first required to complete 30 questions rating how likely they are to engage in the situation 
described. Participants then answered a second, identical set of 30 questions rating how risky they 
perceived the activities to be. Scores are summed for each questionnaire to generate a separate risk 
perception and propensity score.   
 
Time trial cycle ergometery 
 
Time trial tasks were completed using a Velotron cycle ergometer (RacerMate, USA). The ergometer 
was fully customised to the participant’s requirements (Peddle fitting, saddle and handle bar 
adjustments). There are discrepancies in the gear changing operation between the Velotron 
ergometer and a standard road bike; therefore, the warm up also served as a familiarisation of 
ergometer gear changing. Following the completion of the warm up, participants were given the 
chance to ask questions about the ergometer or experimental process. Participants were then 
instructed to complete the 16 km cycling time trial in the fastest possible time. Elapsed distance in 
kilometres was presented to participants throughout warm up and the time trial. Investigators 
remained out of sight and partitioned from the participant using screens. There was no 
pacing/performance guidance given, or verbal communication with participants other than the 
collection of subjective data. The only audible noise was the mechanics of the Velotron ergometer. 
 
Perceived exertion, hazard score and affect  
 
At the end of every two kilometre segment during each time trial, participants were asked to provide 
an overall RPE and affect score. RPE was administered using the Borg 6-20 scale (Borg, 1982) and 
affect was measured using the feeling scale (Hardy and Rejeski, 1989). Participants were familiarised 
with the RPE and affect scales prior to the time trials and the scales were administered in 
accordance to standardised instructions. Hazard score was subsequently calculated for each two 
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kilometre segment as RPE multiplied by the percentage of remaining distance (de Koning et al., 
2011).  
Data analyses 
A median split of risk scores were used to subdivide athlete data into higher and lower BART risk 
taking, DOSPERT risk perception and DOSPERT risk propensity groups. Correlations between the 
change in THI, risk and pacing related variables between sham tDCS and active tDCS conditions were 
calculated by correlating the difference between the active tDCS value and the sham tDCS value; for 
example: 
 
[Active tDCS THI] – [Sham tDCS THI] correlated with [Active tDCS BART] – [Sham tDCS BART] 
 
Between risk group and condition variance in cycling speed was normalised by calculating the two 
kilometre percent deviation from overall average cycling speed.   
 
Statistics 
Differences between higher and lower BART risk takers, DOSPERT risk perceivers and DOSPERT risk 
propensity group scores were analysed using an independent samples t-test. A two-way between 
subject’s ANOVA was used to assess two kilometre segment differences in pace, RPE, hazard score 
and affect between higher and lower risk groups. A Pearson’s correlation test was used to assess the 
relationship between risk scores and initial (0-2 km) pace, while differences in initial pace (0-2 km) 
variance between higher and lower risk groups were analysed using a one-tailed F test.  
Changes in THI from baseline following tDCS in the sham tDCS and active tDCS conditions were 
analysed using a paired samples t test. Differences in risk score between conditions were analysed 
using a one-way repeated measures ANOVA. A two-way repeated measures ANOVA was then used 
to analyse two kilometre segment differences in pace, RPE, hazard score and affect. Intra-individual 
relationships between changes in THI and changes in risk score (BART, DOSPERT) between sham 
tDCS and active tDCS conditions were analysed using a two-tailed Pearson’s correlation test. 
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Similarly, the relationship between changes in risk score (BART, DOSPERT) and changes in pace, RPE, 
hazard score and affect in the first 0-2 km segment of the time trials between sham tDCS and active 
tDCS conditions were analysed using a two-tailed Pearson’s correlation test. As pace data (cycling 
speed) were normalised, the sum of all segment points equalled zero, therefore no condition main 
effects are presented. All results are expressed as means ± 1 SD and effect sizes as eta squared (η2). 
An alpha level of 0.05 was used to indicate statistical significance.  
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Results 
 
 
BART Risk Taking. An independent samples t-test showed total adjusted pumps for lower and higher 
BART risk taking groups were significantly different in fam 1 (650 ± 99 Vs 862 ± 54; t10 = -4.6, P = 
0.001), Sham tDCS (735 ± 111 Vs 928 ± 46; t10 = -3.0, P = 0.003) and Active tDCS (782 ± 83 Vs 939 ± 
46; t10 = -4.0, P = 0.002).  
A two-way within and between subject’s ANOVA showed no risk taking group-by-distance 
interaction, or condition main effect, but did show a significant distance main effect for pace, RPE, 
hazard score, or affect in fam 1, Sham tDCS and Active tDCS conditions (Figure 2; See table 3 for 
statistical results). 
DOSPERT Risk Perception. Risk perception scores for higher and lower risk perception groups were 
significantly different in fam 2 (111 ± 9 Vs 142 ± 16; t8 = -4.1, P = 0.001), Sham tDCS (116 ± 13 Vs 144 
± 11; t11 = -4.1, P = 0.002) and Active tDCS (113 ± 13 Vs 147 ± 13; t11 = -4.7, P = 0.001).  
A two-way within and between subject’s ANOVA showed no risk perception group-by-distance 
interaction, or condition main effect, but did show a significant distance main effect for pace, RPE, 
hazard score, or affect in fam 2, Sham tDCS and Active tDCS conditions (figure 3; See table 4 for 
statistical results). 
DOSPERT Risk Propensity. Risk propensity scores for higher and lower risk propensity groups were 
significantly different for fam 2 (99 ± 10 Vs 124 ± 12; t11 = -4.2, P = 0.002), Sham tDCS (93 ± 10 Vs 123 
± 9; t11 = -5.7, P = 0.000) and Active tDCS (97 ± 15 Vs 127 ± 8; t11 = -4.4, P = 0.001).  
A two-way within and between subject’s ANOVA showed no risk propensity group-by-distance 
interaction, or condition main effect, but did show a significant distance main effect for pace, RPE, 
hazard score, or affect in fam 1, Sham tDCS and Active tDCS conditions (Figure 4; See table 5 for 
statistical results).
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Two-Way ANOVA 
    
Distance Main 
 
Risk Main 
 
Distance * Risk  
    Figure   F df P η2   F df P η2   F df P η2 
Fa
m
 1
 
Pace   2.A1 GG 9.6 3,27 >0.001 0.49 
 
- - - - GG 1.1 3, 27 0.35 0.10 
RPE 2.A2 
GG 36.3 2, 19 >0.001 0.78 
 
0.0 1,10 1.00 0.00 GG 1.4 2, 19 0.28 0.12 
Hazard Score 2.A3 
GG 798.3 2, 23 >0.001 0.99 
 
0.1 1,10 0.73 0.01 GG 0.6 2, 23 0.55 0.06 
Affect 2.A4 
GG 6.5 3, 25 >0.01 0.39 
 
0.0 1,10 0.85 0.00 GG 0.3 3, 25 0.81 0.03 
 
 
 
               
Sh
am
 t
D
C
S 
Pace   2.B1 GG 6.3 2, 22 >0.01 0.39 
 
- - - - GG 0.6 2, 23 0.57 0.06 
RPE 2.B2 
GG 55.8 2, 24 >0.001 0.84 
 
0.0 1,10 0.85 0.00 GG 0.6 2, 24 0.60 0.06 
Hazard Score 2.B3 
GG 610.1 2, 19 >0.001 0.98 
 
0.1 1,10 0.73 0.01 GG 0.3 2, 19 0.58 0.05 
Affect 2.B4 
GG 7.4 2 ,21 >0.01 0.42 
 
0.3 1,10 0.59 0.03 GG 0.4 2, 21 0.71 0.04 
 
 
 
               
A
ct
iv
e 
tD
C
S 
Pace   2.C1 GG 4.3 2, 24 0.02 0.30 
 
- - - - GG 1.3 2, 24 0.29 0.12 
RPE 
2.C2 
GG 58.9 3 ,28 >0.001 0.86 
 
0.0 1,10 0.96 0.00 GG 1.2 3, 28 0.32 0.11 
Hazard Score 
2.C3 
GG 789.2 2, 22 >0.001 0.99 
 
0.1 1,10 0.74 0.01 GG 1.0 2, 22 0.40 0.09 
Affect 
2.C4 
GG 12.4 2, 20 >0.001 0.55 
 
0.0 1,10 0.87 0.00 GG 0.7 2, 20 0.51 0.06 
 
Table 3. Statistical results of two-way within and between subjects’ ANOVA on high and low risk taking groups created via a median split of BART risk 
taking scores during three 16 km cycling time trials. 
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Figure 2. Pace (1), RPE (2), hazard score (3), affect (4) and BART risk taking correlations with 
initial pace (5) between higher and lower BART risk taking groups in three, 16 km cycling time 
trial conditions; fam 1 (A), sham tDCS (B) and active tDCS (C) 
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Two-Way ANOVA 
    
Distance Main 
 
Risk Main 
 
Distance * Risk  
    Figure   F df P η2   F df P η2   F df P η2 
Fa
m
 2
 
Pace   3.A1 GG 14.0 2,26 >0.001 0.56 
 
- - - - GG 0.5 2,26 0.80 0.05 
RPE 3.A2 
GG 58.3 3,28 >0.001 0.84 
 
3.7 1,11 0.08 0.25 GG 0.2 3,28 0.84 0.02 
Hazard Score 3.A3 
GG 617.3 2,21 >0.001 0.98 
 
3.4 1,11 0.09 0.24 GG 1.7 2,21 0.21 0.13 
Affect 3.A4 
GG 11.0 2,21 0.001 0.50 
 
1.5 1,11 0.24 0.12 GG 0.2 2,21 0.85 0.01 
 
 
 
               
Sh
am
 t
D
C
S 
Pace   3.B1 GG 6.5 2,23 0.005 0.37 
 
- - - - GG 0.3 2,23 0.78 0.02 
RPE 3.B2 
GG 48.9 2,24 >0.001 0.82 
 
0.1 1,11 0.83 0.01 GG 0.3 2,24 0.78 0.02 
Hazard Score 
3.B3 
GG 570.9 2,20 >0.001 0.98 
 
0.0 1,11 0.85 0.00 GG 0.2 2,20 0.82 0.02 
Affect 3.B4 
GG 8.9 2,25 0.001 0.45 
 
0.0 1,11 0.95 0.00 GG 0.8 2,25 0.47 0.07 
 
 
 
               
A
ct
iv
e 
tD
C
S 
Pace   3.C1 GG 5.5 2,24 0.009 0.33 
 
- - - - GG 0.4 2,24 0.73 0.03 
RPE 
3.C2 
GG 51.6 3,33 >0.001 0.82 
 
0.3 1,11 0.6 0.03 GG 0.9 3,33 0.45 0.08 
Hazard Score 
3.C3 
GG 712.5 2,21 >0.001 0.99 
 
0.1 1,11 0.76 0.01 GG 0.4 2,21 0.66 0.04 
Affect 
3.C4 
GG 14.1 2,24 >0.001 0.56 
 
0.6 1,11 0.45 0.05 GG 0.5 2,24 0.61 0.05 
 
Table 4. Statistical results of two-way within and between subjects’ ANOVA on high and low risk taking groups created via a median split of 
DOSPERT risk perception scores during three 16 km cycling time trials. 
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Figure 3. Pace (1), RPE (2), hazard score (3), affect (4) and BART risk taking correlations with 
initial pace (5) between higher and lower DOSPERT risk perception groups in three, 16 km 
cycling time trial conditions; fam 1 (A), sham tDCS (B) and active tDCS (C). 
48 
 
  
 
Two-Way ANOVA 
    
Distance Main 
 
Risk Main 
 
Distance * Risk  
    Figure   F df P η2   F df P η2   F df P η2 
Fa
m
 2
 
Pace   4.A1 GG 13.9 2,27 >0.001 0.06 
 
- - - - GG 0.5 2,27 0.62 0.05 
RPE 4.A2 
GG 59.2 2,27 >0.001 0.84 
 
0.5 1,11 0.48 0.05 GG 0.4 2,27 0.74 0.03 
Hazard Score 
4.A3 
GG 547.3 2,19 >0.001 0.98 
 
0.4 1,11 0.55 0.03 GG 0.3 2,19 0.72 0.03 
Affect 4.A4 
GG 11.2 2,21 0.001 0.50 
 
0.1 1,11 0.73 0.01 GG 0.4 2,21 0.66 0.04 
 
 
 
               
Sh
am
 t
D
C
S 
Pace   4.B1 GG 6.4 2,24 >0.01 0.37 
 
- - - - GG 0.0 2,24 0.87 0.01 
RPE 4.B2 
GG 48.8 2,25 >0.001 0.82 
 
0.1 1,11 0.83 0.01 GG 0.2 2,25 0.82 0.02 
Hazard Score 
4.B3 
GG 567.4 2,21 >0.001 0.98 
 
0.0 1,11 0.86 0.00 GG 0.1 2,21 0.88 0.01 
Affect 
4.B4 
GG 8.8 2,25 >0.01 0.45 
 
0.4 1,11 0.54 0.04 GG 0.6 2,25 0.56 0.05 
 
 
 
               
A
ct
iv
e 
tD
C
S 
Pace   4.C1 GG 5.2 2,25 0.01 0.32 
 
- - - - GG 0.4 2,25 0.68 0.04 
RPE 
4.C2 
GG 48.9 3,34 >0.001 0.82 
 
1.6 1,11 0.23 0.13 GG 0.3 3,34 0.80 0.03 
Hazard Score 
4.C3 
GG 740.4 2,23 >0.001 0.99 
 
1.3 1,11 0.27 0.11 GG 0.8 2,23 0.47 0.07 
Affect 
4.C4 
GG 13.6 2,24 >0.001 0.55 
 
0.3 1,11 0.59 0.03 GG 0.4 2,24 0.71 0.03 
 
Table 5. Statistical results of two-way within and between subjects’ ANOVA on high and low risk taking groups created via a median split of DOSPERT 
risk propensity scores during three 16 km cycling time trials. 
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Figure 4. Pace (1), RPE (2), hazard score (3), affect (4) and BART risk taking correlations with 
initial pace (5) between higher and lower DOSPERT risk propensity groups in three, 16 km 
cycling time trial conditions; fam 1 (A), sham tDCS (B) and active tDCS 
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Post Hoc analyses show group variance in pace between higher and lower BART risk takers 
were significantly different in fam 1 (F5,5 = 6.1, P = 0.03), yet sham tDCS (F5,5 = 4.9, P = <0.05) 
and active tDCS conditions (F5,5 = 1.9, P = 0.25) showed no difference (Figure 5a). Variance in 
initial pace between higher and lower DOSPERT risk perception groups showed no difference 
in fam 2 (F5,6 = 2.7, P = 0.13), sham tDCS (F6,5 = 2.2, P = 0.20) or active tDCS (F6,5 = 1.8, P = 0.027) 
conditions (figure 5b). Initial pace variance between higher and lower DOSPERT risk propensity 
groups were significantly different in fam 2 (F5,6 = 5.7, P = 0.03), yet no differences were 
displayed for sham tDCS (F6,5 = 1.9, P = 0.25), or active tDCS (F6,5 = 1.6, P = 0.32) conditions 
(figure 5c).  
Figure 5. Variance of initial (0-2 km) pace (deviation from average speed %) between higher 
and lower BART risk taking (A), DOSPERT risk perception (B) and DOSPERT risk propensity (C) 
groups in fam 1 (BART), fam 2 (DOSPERT), sham tDCS and active tDCS conditions. (* indicates 
statistically different group pace variance)  
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Tissue haemoglobin index. Due to errors in the data files of two participants (one in the sham 
tDCS and one in the active tDCS condition), their data could not be used in the respective 
analyses. A paired samples t-test showed THI did not significantly change from baseline 
following tDCS intervention in both the left (6.6 ± 23.1) and right (8.4 ± 38.5) dlPFC in the sham 
trial tDCS trial (t11 1.0, P = 0.35 and t11 0.8, P = 0.47 respectively; Figure 6a.) confirming the 
placebo tDCS intervention had no modulatory effect on THI. Similarly, no significant change in 
THI from baseline was seen in both the left (4.5 ± 18.0) and right (-3.9 ± 21.3) dlPFC in the 
active tDCS condition (t11 0.9, P = 0.41 and t11 -0.6, P = 0.54 respectively; Figure. 6b.) suggesting 
active tDCS had no modulatory effect on dlPFC blood volume. 
 
Figure 6. Change in THI from baseline following tDCS in the left and right DLPFC in sham (A) 
and active (B) tDCS conditions. 
 
Risk.  One participant was removed from group BART data analyses due to a score exceeding 
two standard deviations from the mean in the sham tDCS trial. A one-way repeated measured 
ANOVA showed no significant difference in BART risk taking scores between fam 1 (777 ± 99), 
sham tDCS (832 ± 129) and active tDCS (860 ± 104) trials (F2,22 = 3.2, P = 0.06, η2 = 0.22) (figure 
7a), although it did approach significance. A one-way repeated measured ANOVA showed no 
significant difference in DOSPERT risk perception scores between fam 2 (125 ± 20), sham tDCS 
(129 ± 18) and active tDCS (128 ± 21) trials (F2,24 = 0.6, P = 0.54, η2 = 0.05) (figure 7b). A one-
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way repeated measured ANOVA also showed no significant difference in DOSPERT risk 
propensity scores between fam 2 (110 ± 17), sham tDCS (109 ± 18) and active tDCS (111 ± 19) 
trials (F2,24 = 0.4, P = 0.69, η2 = 0.03) (figure 7c).  
Performance and pacing.  One participant was removed from data analyses due to outlying 
pace data that exceeded two standard deviations. A one-way repeated measured ANOVA 
indicated there was no significant difference between average speed of fam 1 (35.5 ± 2.3), fam 
2 (36.2 ± 2.1), sham tDCS (63.1 ± 2.5) and active tDCS (36.2 ± 2.8) trials (F3,33 = 1.2, P = 0.34, η2 = 
0.10). For pace, a two-way repeated measures ANOVA showed no significant condition-by-
distance interaction (GG; F4,,47 = 1.3, P = 0.30, η2 = 0.10) between fam 1, fam2, sham tDCS and 
active tDCS conditions, but did show a significant distance main effect (GG; F3,29 = 0.6, P = 
>0.001, η2 = 0.59), meaning pace changed throughout the course of the time trials regardless 
of condition (Figure 8a). 
Ratings of perceived exertion. There was no condition-by-distance interaction for RPE (GG; 
F6,69 = 1.3, P = 0.26, η2 = 0.11) and no condition main effect (F3,33 = 0.3, P = 0.81, η2 = 0.03), but 
there was a distance main effect (GG; F2,22 = 63.1, P = >0.001, η2 = 0.85), indicating RPE 
increased regardless of condition (Figure 8b).  
Hazard score. There was no condition-by-distance interaction (GG; F4,49 = 1.3, P = 0.30, η2 = 
0.10) and no condition main effect for hazard score (F3,33 = 0.7, P = 0.54, η2 = 0.06), but there 
was a significant distance main effect (GG; F2,20 = 800.0, P = >0.001, η2 = 0.10), meaning hazard 
score decreased during the time trials (Figure 8c).  
Affect. There was no condition-by-distance interaction for affect (GG; F6,61 = 1.9, P = 0.10, η2 = 
0.15) and no condition main effect (F3,33 = 1.1, P = 0.36, η2 = 0.09), but there was a distance 
main effect (GG; F2,20 = 15.8, P = >0.001, η2 = 0.59), meaning regardless of condition, affect 
decreased during the time trials (Figure 8d). 
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Figure 7. BART risk taking (A), DOSPERT risk perception (B) and DOSPERT risk propensity (C) 
scores in Fam 1, Fam 2, Sham tDCS and Active tDCS conditions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8. Pace (A), RPE (B), Hazard Score (C) and Affect (D) taken at 2 km intervals during a 16 
km self-paced cycling time trial. 
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Intra-individual effects of tDCS on THI, risk and pacing. 
Differences in THI at the post tDCS intervention level between the sham tDCS and active tDCS 
conditions were correlated against the difference in risk scores from BART and DOSPERT 
measures between sham tDCS and active tDCS conditions.  
Data from two participants were not included in these analyses due to errors in their NIRS data 
files and a further two participant’s data were removed from analyses of the right dlPFC THI 
change due to outlying changes in THI that exceeded two standard deviations from the mean.  
Changes in THI and BART risk taking scores. Two participants were removed from analyses 
due to BART scores that exceeded two times the standard deviation from the mean. A strong 
positive correlation was seen between changes in left dlPFC THI and changes in BART risk 
taking score between sham and active tDCS conditions (r9 = 0.618, P = 0.08; Figure 9a), yet this 
was not significant. No significant correlation was seen between changes in right dlPFC THI and 
BART risk taking score (r7 = -0.440, P = 0.32; figure 9b). 
Changes in THI and DOSPERT risk perception scores. One participant was removed from 
analyses due to a change in DOSPERT risk perception score that exceeded two times the 
standard deviation of the mean. No association was seen between changes in left (r10 = 0.486, 
P = 0.16; Figure 9c) or right (r8 = 0.265, P = 0.53; figure 9d) dlPFC THI and DOSPERT risk 
perception scores between sham tDCS and active tDCS conditions. 
Changes in THI and DOSPERT risk propensity. No association was seen between changes in 
left (r11 = -0.203, P = 0.55; Figure 9e) or right (r9 = -0.524, P = 0.15; figure 9f) dlPFC THI and 
DOSPERT risk propensity scores between sham tDCS and active tDCS conditions. 
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Figure 9. Associations between changes in Left dlPFC THI and BART risk taking (A), DOSPERT risk 
perception (C) and DOSPERT risk propensity (E) scores between sham tDCS and active tDCS 
conditions. Associations between changes in right dlPFC THI and BART risk taking (B), DOSPERT risk 
perception (D) and DOSPERT risk propensity (F) scores between sham tDCS and active tDCS 
conditions. 
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Initial pace and subjective scores in relation to changes in risk scores. Changes in initial (0-2 
km) pace and subjective scores correlated against changes in BART risk taking and DOSPERT 
risk perception and propensity scores between sham tDCS and active tDCS conditions. One 
participant was removed from all pace correlation analyses due to changes in pace that 
exceeded two standard deviations from the mean.  
BART. Two participants were removed from BART correlation analyses due to outlying changes 
in BART score that exceeded two standard deviations from the mean. A significant negative 
correlation was seen between changes in BART risk taking score and changes in initial (0-2 km) 
pace (r10 = - 0.688, P = 0.03; Figure 10a), RPE (r11 = -0.614, P = 0.05; Figure 10b) and hazard 
score (r11 = -0.614, P = 0.05; Figure 10c) between sham and active tDCS conditions. No 
significant association was seen between changes in BART risk taking score and changes in 
affect (r11 = - 0.221, P = 0.51; Figure 10d).  
Figure 10. Association between a change in BART risk taking score and a change in pace (A), RPE 
(B), hazard score (C) and affect (D) between sham tDCS and active tDCS conditions. 
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DOSPERT risk perception. One participant was removed from DOSPERT risk perception 
analyses due to outlying changes in DOSPERT risk perception score that exceeded two 
standard deviations from the mean. No significant association was seen between changes in 
DOSPERT risk perception scores and changes in initial (0-2 km) pace (r12 = - 0.079, P = 0.82; 
figure 11a), RPE (r12 = - 0.006, P = 0.99; figure 11b), hazard score (r12 = - 0.006, P = 0.99; figure 
11c) and affect (r12 = 0.344, P = 0.27; figure 11d) between sham tDCS and active tDCS 
conditions.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 11. Association between a change in DOSPERT risk perception score and a change in pace 
(A), RPE (B), hazard score (C) and affect (D) between sham tDCS and active tDCS conditions. 
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DOSPERT risk propensity. No significant association was seen between changes in DOSPERT 
risk propensity scores and changes in initial (0-2 km) pace (r12 = - 0.151, P = 0.64; figure 12a), 
RPE (r13 = - 0.341, P = 0.26; figure 12b), hazard score (r13 = - 0.341, P = 0.26; figure 12c) and 
affect (r13 = - 0.458, P = 0.12; figure 12d) between sham tDCS and active tDCS conditions.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Figure 12. Association between a change in DOSPERT risk propensity score and a change in pace 
(A), RPE (B), hazard score (C) and affect (D) between sham tDCS and active tDCS conditions. 
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Discussion 
 
This study aimed to further understand the association between risk and pacing behaviour and 
identify how risk influences pace selection. The main findings presented in this study are that 
athlete risk taking, perception and propensity characteristics do not associate with pacing 
behaviours at a group level, yet higher and lower risk groups display different initial pace 
variance. Further to this, increased individual risk taking behaviour associated with a 
decreased relative starting pace. 
Pacing behaviour between higher and lower risk taking, risk perceiving or propensity groups 
did not differ. Similarly; RPE, hazard score and affect all remained similar between risk groups. 
We hypothesised higher risk takers, lower risk perceivers and higher risk propensity groups 
would start faster than the convers risk group, yet this is not founded in our results and we 
therefore reject part A of our hypothesis. Our findings indicate that risk does not associate 
with pacing behaviour and contrasts that of previous literature (Micklewright et al., 2015). 
Associations described by Micklewright et al. (2015) were presented from a larger sample size 
than the present study, yet similar associations may be expected to reflect in a smaller 
population and perhaps indicates the fidelity to which risk influences pacing. However, it 
important to point out that differences - whether it be in pace (Micklewright et al. (2015) or 
group pace variance (present study) - always occurs at the beginning of the exercise, 
highlighting perhaps the importance of inter-individual differences and initial pace selection.  
Although pace between risk groups did not differ, it is interesting to note the degree of 
variability in starting pace between higher and lower risk groups and the relationship that 
unfolds between conditions. Higher BART risk takers in fam 1 (figure 5a) show significantly less 
group variance in pace than lower risk takers, perhaps indicating higher risk taking athletes are 
more consistent in their approach to the time trial; demonstrating a more uniform pacing 
behaviour than lower risk takers. However, this relationship is not consistent between trials; 
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and instead the variance of pace in the higher BART risk taking groups increases from fam 1, to 
sham tDCS and active tDCS trials. Conversely, pacing variance in the lower BART risk taking 
groups decreased from fam 1 to sham tDCS and active tDCS. This trend is similarly reflected in 
higher and lower DOSPERT risk perceiving and propensity athletes, where lower risk perceiving 
(figure 5b) and propensity (figure 5c) athletes in fam 2 show considerably smaller pace 
variance than higher risk perceiving and propensity athletes. This perhaps indicates that the 
level of measured risk taking, perception or propensity has a dynamic effect on pacing variance 
in conjunction with the level of experience an athlete has in a particular exercise environment. 
For example, lower risk perceiving athletes in fam 1 appear to adopt similar pace strategies, 
yet as they progress between conditions, developing a greater understanding of specific 
exercise demands, group pacing variance increases. This indicates lower risk perceiving 
athletes pace variance increases with experience perhaps suggests they are more willing to try 
a different strategy to achieve a better performance. However, these observations have been 
made only by looking at inter-quartile ranges presented in figure 5, and as higher and lower 
risk groups may have contained the same or different athletes between conditions, it is not 
possible to statistically confirm these trends in group pace variance. Future research may 
consider screening athletes prior to inclusion in the study to create highly contrasting risk 
groups and assess how group pace variance fluctuates between multiple trials.  
We further sought to understand how changes in an athlete’s risk taking, perception and 
propensity characteristics result in different pacing behaviours by using tDCS to target the 
dlPFC. Between conditions, BART and DOSPERT scores remained unchanged at a group level; 
and this stability is reflected in unchanged pacing behaviour between all four trials at a group 
level. RPE, hazard score and affect also remain unchanged between fam 1, fam 2, sham tDCS 
and active tDCS conditions, indicating that athletes experienced each condition similarly. Given 
the stability in risk taking, perception and propensity between conditions, it is not surprising 
that pace behaviour remained consistent and we therefore reject part B of our hypothesis. 
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At a group level we are unable to infer causality with regard to how risk influences pacing 
behaviours as risk characteristics between conditions did not change. This may question the 
effectiveness of our tDCS intervention with regard to the modulatory effect tDCS had on dlPFC 
functional activation, and the subsequent effect on risk behaviours. However, tDCS has proven 
to modulate functional brain activity (Li et al., 2015), and the dlPFC is causally linked with risk 
based decisions and behaviours (Krain et al., 2006). Following tDCS, THI did not change in 
either sham tDCS or active tDCS conditions (figure 6) which at face value suggests tDCS was 
not effective. However, perhaps a more likely explanation is that THI may not have been 
suitable for monitoring tDCS induced function brain activity changes or that an unknown 
amount of variability may have encroached the THI data due to the optode removal and 
replacement process. However, when associating the change in THI and risk between sham 
tDCS and active tDCS conditions, an intra-individual effect seems to have occurred whereby 
increases in left dlPFC THI appear to positively correlate with increased BART risk taking score 
(figure 9a). This perhaps suggests THI is better suited for assessment of momentary brain 
activity states, yet may lack the fidelity to assess functional changes in brain activity. We 
further associated changes in BART and DOSPERT risk measures with changes in starting pace 
(0-2 km) between sham tDCS and active tDCS conditions given the large degrees of variation in 
both measures. We see that an increase in BART risk taking score between sham tDCS and 
active tDCS conditions associates with a decrease in relative starting pace (figure 10a). This 
seems somewhat contradictory, considering that an increase in BART risk taking score 
indicates an increase in risk taking behaviours under uncertainty (Lejuez et al., 2002), whereas 
a decreased initial pace would suggest reduced risk taking under uncertainty (St Clair Gibson et 
al., 2006). The corresponding negative association between RPE and BART risk taking further 
indicates that athletes were aware of the discrepancies in exercise intensity. Such associations 
were not founded in DOSPERT risk perception or propensity changes which is indicative of the 
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nature of risk the DOSPERT risk measure, given the trait like properties characterised (Johnson 
et al., 2004).  
Despite the contradictory association presented between BART score and initial pace, it 
presents intrigue into why the two behaviours are negatively associated. As previously 
postulated, athletes are faced by uncertainty regarding the outcome of their pacing choice at 
the beginning of an event (St Clair Gibson et al., 2006) and the BART presents uncertainty of 
balloon explosion points. It may be presumed the two tasks would positively associate with 
one another, where increased risk taking under uncertainty would reflect in both tasks. This 
however was not supported and we postulate two possible explanations centred on either the 
differences in appraised value that each task holds, or a change in pacing strategy adopted 
between conditions. 
Value computation describes a process whereby the worth of a particular action is calculated 
relative to its likely outcome and is the cornerstone to much economic and psychological goal 
directed decision making theory (Rangel and Hare, 2010); such as Expected Utility Theory (Von 
Neumann and Morgenstern, 1945) and Prospect Theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). Goal 
directed choices, such as maximising monetary reward in the BART, or achieving a personal 
best (PB) time in a cycling time trial, would require expected outcome valuation and expected 
action cost to generate an expected action value (Padoa-Schioppa, 2011; Rangel and Hare, 
2010). Individuals are believed to compare such action values in goal directed decision making 
where riskier behaviours are more likely to be selected to accrue outcomes with a higher 
personal value (Slovic et al., 2005; Furby and Beyth-Marom, 1992). For example, a cyclist 
would be more likely to select a pacing strategy with a faster start if it is forecasted to achieve 
a personal best performance time even if entails high physiological costs and a risk of failure, 
compared against a strategy that may possibly achieve a personal best time but with a low risk 
of failure.  
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In the present study, athletes voluntarily participated for the explicit reason of time trailing, 
where desired goals can be presumably affixed to that of time trial performance. The BART 
however, (a measure of monetary based risk taking behaviour) was performed with a fictitious 
monetary reward and all that participants stood to gain or lose was the achievement of a 
greater score. Therefore, the reward of achieving a relatively high performance in competitive 
athletes may represent a considerably higher value than that of the decisions made in a 
fictitious monetary task. While this may explain the discrepancies between how the tasks may 
be appraised, it does not explain how a decrease in BART risk taking associates with increased 
starting pace.  
Here we suggest that perhaps computation of action values associated with each respective 
task shifted somewhat between trials. For example, an increased relative starting pace and 
decreased BART score may be the product of increased awareness of the personal value of 
task outcomes. Where athletes display riskier behaviours to achieve a higher performance in a 
time trial task, and less risk in a fictitious task with little personal reward. Conversely, where 
awareness of personal outcome values is reduced, increased propensity for risk is displayed in 
the BART and reduced risk in the time trial.  
Value computations are critically associated with activity of (among others) the dlPFC (Saraiva 
and Marshall, 2015; Sokol-Hessner et al., 2012; Hutcherson et al., 2012), which serves to 
modulate value encoding streams from other cortical regions (Rudorf and Hare, 2014). 
Therefore, given the nature of intervention provided in this study, it should not be ruled out 
that tDCS may have had a profound effect on a psychological process (such as value 
computation) beyond the recognition of the implemented measures. Therefore, it is plausible 
that a modulation of dlPFC activity induced differential levels of value computation between 
trials, leading to differential pacing behaviours. 
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While shifts in value computation seem a viable explanation, it must also be considered that 
athletes may have been explicitly adopting a different pacing strategy. For example, a shift 
from a parabolic, to a more even strategy, where a decreased relative starting pace gave way 
for a more even pace but at a higher velocity, which may also be considered a risky strategy.  
When considering the findings of the current study in conjunction with existing pace literature, 
it is interesting to note that our findings cannot be accounted for in any previous pace 
regulation models. Our results highlight that differences between individual athletes - in 
respect to trait characteristics - influence athletic decision making. It is also important to note 
that the differences presented in this study and by Micklewright et al. (2015) occur at the 
beginning of the exercise task; the point at which athletes are faced with the largest degree of 
uncertainty and therefore risk (St Clair Gibson et al., 2006). This is something that seems to 
have been overlooked in previous pacing models where an emphasis has been placed on the 
axiom that the perceived exertion construct is the primary regulating mechanism for pace. As 
such, current understanding with respect to how athletes make decisions regarding pace (in 
particular initial pace) appears vague.  
The central governor model (CGM; Noakes et al., 2004) claims initial pace is set by the brain ‘in 
anticipation’ of exercise demands relative to expected task duration, yet does not specify how 
this computation is calculated beyond the feed-forward regulation of motor unit recruitment 
by a subconscious controller region. While the acclamation of ‘anticipated’ exercise demands 
is made by the CGM, nowhere in this model is there an allowance for differential 
interpretation of task related feedback and individual factors leading to different pace 
behaviours. Unfortunately, this lack of clarity is reflected in a number of pace models where 
the scalar linear increase in perceived exertion commonly observed in exercise performances 
(Faulkner et al., 2008) overshadows the decisional process that must take place; such as the 
RPE template model (Tucker, 2009) and estimated time limit model (Garcin et al., 2012). The 
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hazard score model presented by de Koning et al. (2011) attempts to understand this decision 
process, yet is based on the same scalar linear increase of perceived exertion and merely 
dictates the risk an exercise intensity poses in relation to the amount of event completed. This 
model therefore fails to determine how this information may have been interpreted differently 
according to, for example, differential risk trait characteristics - as presented in this study.   
Perceptions of exertion undoubtedly hold a strong relationship with spatial and temporal 
aspects of an exercise task (Faulkner et al., 2008). However, such generalisation that have 
become the core of many pacing models lack the precision to expose actual pace decisions 
made and are too linear in their approach. This is exemplified when considering the similar 
perceived exertion responses generated from differential work rates presented by 
Micklewright et al. (2015). Using derivatives of task-related feedback in a feed-forward 
mechanism rather than understanding how athletes interpret and act upon the information 
exposed to them has led to a singular dimensional approach to pace regulation, rather than a 
dynamic approach that would be required to explain results presented in the current study. 
This is particularly exemplified as such models cannot explain ‘bad’ pacing decisions, given that 
pace should be modified to maintain a scalar linear increase in perceived exertion. However, 
by accounting for differences between individuals, suboptimal pacing decisions could be 
ascribed to differential pace selection biases such as risk traits, or computed value of the 
behaviour outcome.  
A recent proposal by Smits et al. (2014) highlights the complex nature of decisions made 
during an exercise task and explicitly recognises individual factors in behaviour selection. The 
affordance-competition hypothesis; a conceptualisation of ecological psychology, serves to 
explain how athletes interpret and act upon environmental information. This framework 
highlights the interdependence between perception and action (Micklewright et al., 2016), 
with the prefrontal area of the human brain interjecting individual preferences in behaviour 
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selection. Such models help us to understand how athletes behave in response to their 
competitive environment; a similar account should also be taken to understand isolated pacing 
decisions relative the nature of individual athletes’. 
The development of pace research has undoubtedly been informed by the relationship of 
perceived exertion with exercise tasks (Faulkner et al., 2008), yet to understand with greater 
confidence and accuracy; accounting for individual differences in pace regulation is need. 
Integrating individual factors and decision making processes into our understanding of pace 
regulation will allow a greater degree of flexibility in understanding pace behaviours in real-
life, competitive scenarios (Micklewright et al., 2016). The need for pace regulation models 
capable of individualisation is evident and a rich psychological, economic and neuroscientific 
literature will help inform such conceptualisations. Such models need not be overly 
sophisticated or complex, but instead need to allow for differential pace behaviours to be 
explained via a number of inter-individual factors; such as risk or value computation.   
Future research concerning the manifestation of risk in pacing behaviour should seek to 
understand how processes that inform human risk taking behaviours translates into the pacing 
context. Value computation highlights just one computational complexity of the decision 
making construct that may affect an athletes’ behaviour. Motivational forces for example may 
also play a significant role in an athletes’ risk based behaviours (Redish et al., 2015) and has 
previously been postulated as a regulatory factor (Marcora, 2010).  
Conclusions 
In this study we have presented evidence that differences between athlete risk characteristics 
do not influence pacing behaviours at a group level; however instead, subtler differences are 
evident in the variance of starting pace between higher and lower risk taking, perception and 
propensity groups. We further demonstrated that a change in measured risk taking 
characteristics associates with a change in starting pace behaviour that may be attributable to 
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differential value computations. This study has indicated that the association between risk and 
pacing behaviour is dynamic and highly intra-individual. Therefore, future research must 
consider accounting for this by increasing the fidelity to which the concept is both investigated 
in pace regulation and incorporated into the wider pacing literature.   
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Appendix 
 
Transcranial Direct Current Stimulation Adult Safety Screen 
Questionnaire 
(Please answer all questions honestly by ticking the appropriate box)  
 Yes No  
 
Do you have epilepsy or have you ever had a convulsion or a seizure? 
 
□ □ 
 
Does anyone in your family have epilepsy? □ □ 
 
Have you ever had a head trauma that was diagnosed as a concussion or was associated with 
loss of consciousness 
□ □ 
 
Do you have any hearing problems or ringing in your ears? 
 
□ □ 
 
Do you have cochlear implants? 
 
□ □ 
 
Do you have metal in the brain, skull or elsewhere in your body (e.g., splinters, fragments, clips, 
etc.)? If so, specify the type of metal:………………………………………………………………………………………….... 
□ □ 
 
Do you have an implanted neurostimulator (e.g., DBS, epidural/subdural, VNS)? 
 
□ □ 
 
Do you have a cardiac pacemaker or intracardiac lines? 
 
□ □ 
 
Do you have a medication infusion device? 
 
□ □ 
 
Are you taking any medications? (If yes, please list) …………………………………………………………………….. 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
□ □ 
 
Have you ever undergone tDCS in the past? (If so, please state if any problems occurred) 
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………......................................... 
 
□ □ 
 
Do you suffer or have you in the past suffered from any skin condition? 
 
□ □ 
 
Do you suffer from any neurologic disease (other than epilepsy) or other medical condition?  
 
 
□ □ 
Have you ever had a fainting spell or syncope? If yes, please describe on which occasion(s)? 
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………......................................... □ □ 
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Do you suffer from daily or severe headaches? 
□ □ 
Have you ever had a stroke? 
□ □ 
Have you ever had a serious head injury (/had neurosurgery)? 
□ □ 
Have you had an illness that caused brain injury? 
□ □ 
Have you had any brain related condition? 
□ □ 
 
This is now then end of the questionnaire 
 
 
 
 
If you answered NO to all of the questions above, you are cleared for physical activity. 
 
If you answered YES to one or more of the above questions, please speak to a supervisor regarding 
your participation within this study. 
 
Please read and sign the declaration below: 
 
I, the undersigned, have read, understood to my full satisfaction and completed this questionnaire. I 
acknowledge that this electrical stimulation clearance is valid for a maximum of 12 months from the 
date it is completed and becomes invalid if my condition changes. I also acknowledge that a Trustee 
(such as my employer, community/fitness centre, health care provider, or other designate) may retain a 
copy of this form for their records. In these instances, the Trustee will be required to adhere to local, 
national, and international guidelines regarding the storage of personal health information ensuring that 
they maintain the privacy of the information and do not misuse or wrongfully disclose such information. 
 
Date: … … / … … / … … 
Name: ………………………………………………… Witness: ………………………………………………… 
Signature: ………………………………………….. Signature: ……………………………………………… 
 
Appendix A1. Transcranial direct current stimulation screening questionnaire.  
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  People often see some risk in situations that contain uncertainty about what the outcome or consequences will be and for which 
there is the possibility of negative consequences.  However, riskiness is a very personal and intuitive notion, and we are interested in 
your gut level assessment of how risky each situation or behaviour is. For each of the following statements, please indicate how 
risky you perceive each situation.  Provide a tick using the scale to the left: 
 
       Admitting that your tastes are different from those of a friend. (S) 
       Going camping in the wilderness. (R) 
       Betting a day's income at the horse races. (F) 
       Investing 10% of your annual income in a moderate growth mutual fund. (F) 
       Drinking heavily at a social function. (H/S) 
       Taking some questionable deductions on your income tax return. (E) 
       Disagreeing with an authority figure on a major issue. (S) 
       Betting a day's income at a high-stake poker game. (F) 
       Having an affair with a married man/woman. (E) 
       Passing off somebody else's work as your own. (E) 
       Going down a ski run that is beyond your ability. (R) 
       Investing 5% of your annual income in a very speculative stock. (F) 
       Going whitewater rafting at high water in the spring. (R) 
       Betting a day's income on the outcome of a sporting event (F) 
       Engaging in unprotected sex. (H/S) 
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       Revealing a friend's secret to someone else. (E) 
       Driving a car without wearing a seat belt. (H/S) 
       Investing 10% of your annual income in a new business venture. (F) 
       Taking a skydiving class. (R) 
       Riding a motorcycle without a helmet. (H/S) 
       Choosing a career that you truly enjoy over a more secure one. (S) 
       Speaking your mind about an unpopular issue in a meeting at work. (S) 
       Sunbathing without sunscreen. (H/S) 
       Bungee jumping off a tall bridge. (R) 
       Piloting a small plane. (R) 
       Walking home alone at night in an unsafe area of town. (H/S) 
       Moving to a city far away from your extended family. (S) 
       Starting a new career in your mid-thirties. (S) 
       Leaving your young children alone at home while running an errand. (E) 
       Not returning a wallet you found that contains $200. (E) 
 
Appendix A2. Domain specific risk taking (DOSPERT) perception questionnaire. 
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For each of the following statements, please indicate your likelihood of engaging in each activity or behavior.  Provide tick the 
appropriate box, using the scale to the left: 
       Admitting that your tastes are different from those of a friend. (S) 
       Going camping in the wilderness. (R) 
       Betting a day's income at the horse races. (F) 
       Investing 10% of your annual income in a moderate growth mutual fund. (F) 
       Drinking heavily at a social function. (H/S) 
       Taking some questionable deductions on your income tax return. (E) 
       Disagreeing with an authority figure on a major issue. (S) 
       Betting a day's income at a high-stake poker game. (F) 
       Having an affair with a married man/woman. (E) 
       Passing off somebody else's work as your own. (E) 
       Going down a ski run that is beyond your ability. (R) 
       Investing 5% of your annual income in a very speculative stock. (F) 
       Going white-water rafting at high water in the spring. (R) 
       Betting a day's income on the outcome of a sporting event (F) 
       Engaging in unprotected sex. (H/S) 
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       Revealing a friend's secret to someone else. (E) 
       Driving a car without wearing a seat belt. (H/S) 
       Investing 10% of your annual income in a new business venture. (F) 
       Taking a skydiving class. (R) 
       Riding a motorcycle without a helmet. (H/S) 
       Choosing a career that you truly enjoy over a more secure one. (S) 
       Speaking your mind about an unpopular issue in a meeting at work. (S) 
       Sunbathing without sunscreen. (H/S) 
       Bungee jumping off a tall bridge. (R) 
       Piloting a small plane. (R) 
       Walking home alone at night in an unsafe area of town. (H/S) 
       Moving to a city far away from your extended family. (S) 
       Starting a new career in your mid-thirties. (S) 
       Leaving your young children alone at home while running an errand. (E) 
       Not returning a wallet you found that contains $200. (E) 
 
Appendix A3. Domain specific risk taking (DOSPERT) propensity questionnaire. 
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Appendix A4. Screenshot of balloon analogue risk task (BART) interface.  
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Appendix A5. Ratings of perceived exertion (RPE) scale 
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Appendix A6. Feeling scale.  
 
